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I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this paper is the antidumping regimes of Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan. Though it would be possible for nations to
construct antidumping regimes to function with some autonomy from
economic and political forces, this has not been the case in
jurisdictions with traditionally active antidumping regimes.' Even
introductory texts on antidumping law quickly move beyond narrow
explications of the rules to discuss historical, economic, political,
diplomatic, and other non-legal variables that affect antidumping
practices.2 Following in this "realist" vein, this paper will examine the
antidumping practices of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in light of
broadly similar national industrial policies pursued by the three
nations. These industrial policies merge politics and economics in
pursuit of national goals, so that as in other jurisdictions, non-legal
concerns will influence antidumping practices. What distinguishes
these antidumping regimes from the United States model is the extent
to which the impinging political, economic and other influences
originate in or are filtered through relatively insulated and autonomous
government bureaucracies, rather than the legislative branch or the
private sphere.
Through the 1950s and into the 1960s, the industrial
preeminence of the United States allowed it to progressively liberalize
imports, while its industries seldom needed protection. But as Japan
rebuilt its industrial base and its exports regained the ability to
' Since 1980, four jurisdictions, the United States, Canada, Australia and the
European Community, were responsible for roughly 98% of the antidumping actions
notified to the GATTs Committee on Antidumping Practices. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 231 (1989). In the United States, for example, where the International
Trade Commission ("USITC") functions as a quasi-judicial body, the debate does not
generally concern whether the USITC should be more or less independent, but instead
concerns which other branch of government, the executive, the legislative, or the
judiciary, will have greater influence over USITC decisions.
2 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 1, chapter 10 and passim.
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threaten United States industry,3 it became one of the prime targets of
United States protectionist measures. Taiwan and South Korea began
their major industrialization drives somewhat later, but as exports
began to threaten United States manufacturers they were also
targeted in a series of protective actions. In the 1970s and 1980s,
exports from these three Asian nations were at the center of United
States trade policy debates, and much attention had been paid to
United States antidumping actions vis-a-vis their exports. Very little
has been written, however, on the antidumping regimes of these
nations, or their enforcement.
Although Japan, South Korea and Taiwan began their post-
World War II development with high levels of protection in many
areas,4 their economic success makes it increasingly difficult for them
to stave off multilateral and/or bilateral pressures for greater import
liberalization. Industries in all three nations face competition from
imports in their domestic markets, a trend that is only likely to grow
in the foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, all three governments
have their own antidumping regimes in place, and have accepted
petitions for antidumping relief from domestic industries.5
Because Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have recently all
begun active antidumping enforcement, and because these nations
arguably share a common orientation toward international trade, it
seems appropriate to explore, at this juncture, the wider non-legal
environments in which these antidumping regimes exist and will be
enforced. Therefore, rather than probing the depths of any one
' In the 1930s Japan's textile exports threatened United States and other textile
producers to such an extent that Japan was forced into a series of voluntary export
restraint agreements. Kent Jones, Voluntary Export Restraint: Political Economy,
History and the Role of the GATT, 23 JOURNALOF WORLDTRADE 125, 129 (1989).
For ajournalistic account of turn-of-the-century Japan's trade regime, see THOMAS F.
MILLARD, AMERICAAND rHE FAR EAsTERN QUESTION 15-38 (1909).
4 See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
5 In the United States context, it is generally understood that GATT-driven lowering
of trade barriers resulted in increased import penetration by the mid-I 970s, which in
turn translated into political pressure for more "user friendly" antidumping rules. See
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 229.
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regime, this paper will first attempt to provide a broad historical
context for understanding the trade regimes of these three nations. It
will then outline the individual antidumping regimes of Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan, and how they have been applied to date. Finally,
it will offer some predictions on how these regimes are likely to be
enforced in the future, with specific reference to whether
commonalities in trade outlooks will lead to convergence, or whether
political, economic, or other factors will overcome any pressure for
convergence and lead to divergent practices.
II. ANTIDUMPING LAW IN THE BRETITON WOODS SYSTEM
Notwithstanding recent concern over revived protectionism in
the wealthy industrialized nations,6 since the end of World War II, the
world has seen an exceptional liberalization of trade in manufactured
goods as facilitated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")y and the larger Bretton Woods system. Yet, although the
GATT has been a force for import liberalization, it has always allowed
Members8 to protect their domestic industries against dumped
imports.
A. Discipline over Dumping in International Trade
The GATT system was primarily the brainchild of the United
6 See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 1 (1988).
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187. As a result of the successful conclusion
of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT as drafted in 1947 and thereafter
amended has been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, available in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 79-96 (Documents Supp. 1995) [hereinafter GATT 94].
GATT 94 is in turn annexed to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, available in JACKSON, Id. at 3-14 [hereinafter WTO Charter].
8 Nations party to the GATT will be referred to throughout as "Members." With the
creation of the WTO as a body having international legal personality, the term
"Member" has become a legally accurate description of their status.
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States and Great Britain,9 two nations that had been engaged in
competitive industrialization throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The United States in particular complained of
dumped imports as early as 1791,10 and adopted its first modem
antidumping statute in 1916.11 Although some now question on
economic grounds the likelihood of predatory dumping,12 or the logic
of counteracting dumping if it does occur, 3 the terms of the debate in
the pre-GATT world were much more clear. In the words of Lord
Brougham to the House of Commons:
It was well worth while to incur a loss upon the first
exportation, in order, by the glut, to stifle in the cradle
those rising manufactures in the United States which
the war had forced into existence contrary to the
natural course of things. 4
9 Or perhaps the English supplied the brains, the United States the economic and
political "brawn." BHAGwATI, supra note 6, at 2.
10 The history of United States' antidumping policies is discussed in more detail, See
infra notes 429-45 and accompanying text.
" Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, sections 800-801, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. §72
[1976]). Although this law still exists, there has never been a case in the U.S. which
has been successful under this statute. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 228 & n.43. The
current United States antidumping statute was enacted in its original form in 1921. For
a discussion of the origins of the 1916 and 1921 laws, see JACKSON, id. at 225 n.26,
228 & n.45.
" The standard argument is that few cases of predatory dumping have been proven,
and further, that the conditions necessary for predatory dumping to create a profitable
monopoly or oligopoly situation are unlikely to be met. See, e.g., Alan V. Deardorff,
Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in ANTIDUIMING LAW AND PRACTICE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDy 35-36 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds.,
1989)[hereinafter Deardorff].
,3 The argument being that if dumping does occur, it functions as a transfer of wealth
from the exporting to the importing nation, in spite of damage it may cause to
individual firms and their employees in the importing nation. See, e.g., Deardorff,
supra note 12, at 26-29.
14 Quoted in I MICHAEL HuDsON, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN DEBT: A
HISTORY OF THEORiEs OF POLARISATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 141 (1992). Lord Brougham was speaking of the Napoleonic Wars (1793-
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The "natural course of things", to which Lord Brougham referred,
involved a colonial division of labor in which Britain would import
raw materials from its colonies and export manufactures in return. A
newly independent America, like later developing countries, did not
accept that this trade pattern was natural, or that exporting raw
materials would lead to national wealth, as the free trade theory
predicted. 5 Americans feared the effects of dumped British goods on
their infant manufacturing industries, and this "common sense" fear of
dumping seems to have dominated political debate and policy making
through the nineteenth century and up to the creation of the GATT
system. 16
B. The GA 7TAntidumping Framework
The United States and other nations adopted antidumping
legislation during the early part of this century, 7 in the absence of
multilateral harmonization mechanisms. This changed with the
1814) that provided a boost to infant industries in the United States (and in other
nations) by diverting Britain's manufacturing might away from exports. Id. at 107-111.
"5 David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and other free trade writers argued that
equalization mechanisms that would function in an international free trade regime
would make it irrelevant to a developing country's national wealth whether that nation
industrialized, or continued to trade its raw materials for British manufactures.
Hudson, supra note 14, at 92 (arguing that this position arose in conjunction with the
need among British statesmen for an internationalist argument to convince less
developed countries to join in dismantling world tariff barriers).
16 As Judith Goldstein notes of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
Americans, "[W]hile they embraced John Locke, Americans shunned Adam Smith.
This rejection of the logic of liberal trade occurred not only with full knowledge of
Smithian ideas but also with the understanding that these ideas were more compatible
with the American conception of limited government than was the protectionist
alternative." JuDiTH GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY
239 (1993). Despite growing influence offree trade theory in academia and elsewhere,
protectionism remained the fundamental trade orientation of the United States until the
passage of institutional reform legislation in 1934. Id. at 137-54.
7 Japan had antidumping legislation of some sort as early as 1920. Shintaro Hagiwara,
First Application of Japanese Antidumping Law, 21 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
LAWYER 378,378 (1993).
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creation of the Bretton Woods system in the late 1940s, as the GATT
took on the role of providing basic ground rules with which Members'
national antidumping regimes must comply, at least vis-a-vis other
Members.18 Until the completion of the Uruguay Round and the
establishment of the WTO Charter, GATT discipline over the
antidumping actions of its Members was provided by GATT Article
VI and the Antidumping Code negotiated during the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations (1973-1979).19 GATT 94 incorporates the
original GATT agreement and prior "side agreements", such as the
Antidumping Code, into a single document for legal purposes, but
retains Article VI as the basic source of law, with the incorporated
Antidumping Code providing necessary elaboration.
GATT Article VI defines dumping as that which occurrs when
"products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than the normal value of the products."2 "Normal
value" being defined as:
(a) the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for
consumption in the exporter's market, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price,
(i) the highest comparable price for the
like product for export to any third
country in the ordinary course of trade,
or
(ii) the cost of production of the product
in the country of origin plus a
x The fact that this GATT discipline applies only to antidumping actions vis-a-vis
other GATT Members becomes important in the context of antidumping actions by
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan against exports from the People's Republic of China.
"' Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, GATT, B.I.S.D. 26S/171 (1980) [hereinafter "Antidumping
Code"]. The earlier antidumping code, negotiated during the Kennedy Round of
GATT negotiations (1962-1967) was effectively replaced by the Tokyo Round
Antidumping Code. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 226-27.
20 GATT, supra note 7, at art. VI.
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reasonable addition for selling cost and
profit.2
If dumped products cause or threaten material injury to an established
industry in the territory of the importing Member producing like
products or materially retard the establishment of such an industry, the
importing Member may levy an antidumping duty less than or equal
to the amount by which the normal value of the products exceeds their
export price (the "dumping margin").22
As time passed, calls arose for further GATT discipline on
antidumping procedures, which ultimately led to the creation of the
Antidumping Code.' The Antidumping Code supplements Article VI
by clarifying definitions of "dumping," "material injury," and "domestic
industry," as well as providing procedural rules for the conduct of
antidumping investigations. The Antidumping Code also provides
rules concerning the collection of evidence, the use of price
undertakings, and the imposition and collection of antidumping duties.
Finally, the Antidumping Code requires that Members provide
avenues for judicial review of antidumping decisions, and creates a
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices to supervise Members'
antidumping practices.
Japan joined the GATT in 1955,24 while South Korea joined
21 Id. at art. VI(1).
22 Id.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 226.
24 Japan received provisional GATT status in 1953 and was admitted as a Contracting
Party in 1955. Kazuo Sato, Trade Policies in Japan, in NATIONAL TRADE POLICES
109, 112, 2 HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES (Dominick Salvatore
ed., 1992). Japan's GATT membership was supported by the United States, and the
only other countries to accord Japan full GATT benefits were Canada, West Germany,
and the Scandinavian countries. Id. For a discussion of the Cold War context of the
United States sponsorship of Japan, see DAL-JOONG CHANG, ECONOMIC CONTROL AND
POLmcAL AuTHORITARIANISM: THE ROLE OF JAPANESE CORPORATIONS IN KOREAN
POLITICS 1965-1979, 39-40 (1985).
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in 1967.25 Both nations subsequently joined the Antidumping Code
and have now signed the WTO Charter. Taiwan has not been a
member of the GATT during recent decades, has not signed the
Antidumping Code, and has not been admitted to the WTO. So in
theory, Taiwan's antidumping practice is constrained only by
economic and political considerations.26 But Taiwan's major political
concern with regard to trade policy is admission to the WTO, so that
its antidumping and other trade practices are to a great extent
constrained by GATT standards.
27
III. JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND COMMON TRADE REGIMES
Stories of East Asian miracles, which have continued unabated
since the 1960s,' are supplemented now with predictions of a Pacific
25 Chan Jin Kim, New Antidumping Law of Korea, 15 KOREAN JouRNAl OF
COMPARATVELAW 1, 2 (1987).
26 The government of the Republic of China, which in 1944 ruled much of China
from its wartime capital in Chongqing, was represented at Bretton Woods and was an
original GATT Member. That government, which has governed only Taiwan since
1949, arguably renounced GATT membership in 1950. Jackson, supra note 1, at 47
& n. 103. Since that time, neither Taiwan nor the People's Republic of China have
been GATT Members.
27 Taiwan applied to join/rejoin the GATT in 1990, and the GATT began formal
consideration of its application in September, 1992. Taiwan Plans U.S.-Style Trade
Law, January 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. As part of the
application process, GATT/WTO Members have submitted to the Taiwanese
government as many as 300 questions concerning Taiwan's trade practices. Osman
Tseng, New Trade Law Sets Rules on Free, Open Commerce, BusINEss TAIWAN,
February 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. Taiwan's
Economics Minister P.K. Chiang, then chairman of Taiwan's Trade Investigation
Committee, reportedly said that the panel will function according to the guidelines set
by the GATT. Import Relief Panel - Stainless Steel Rods, China Economic News
Service, July 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
I Chalmers Johnson cites the ECONOMIST issues of September I and 8, 1962, as the
first of the "miracle" pieces by Western writers on post-war Asia. CHALMERS
JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
1925-1975 1 (1982).
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Century and a rehabilitation of "Confucian values.""' Although its
level of development (and perhaps its current deep recession) make
Japan a "Western" country in the eyes of some, it is Japan's example
that continues to inform economic and political thinking in Asia.3"
Japan weathered the storm of nineteenth century Western imperialism
with its sovereignty more or less intact,31 while at the same time
29 For a critique of "miracle" literature, see Bruce Cumings, Rimspeak; or The
Discourse of the "Pacific Rim ", in WHAT IS IN A RIM?: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE PACIFIC REGION IDEA 29 (Arif Dirlik ed., 1993).
" Michael P. Ryan, IndustrialPolicy: Concepts and Theory, in INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
IN THE PACIFIC 1, 11-12 (Gunnar K. Sletmo & Gavin Boyd eds., 1994). Bruce
Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy,
38 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION I, passim (1984) (reprinted in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (Fredric C. Deyo, ed. 1987)). On
South Korea, see ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREAN AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION 51, and passim, (1989). On Taiwan, see ROBERT WADE,
GOVERNING THE MARKET 47-50, and passim (1990).
" China relinquished autonomy to set tariff rates by treaties signed with Great Britain
in 1842 and 1843 ending the Opium War (1839-1842). Mingchien Joshua Bau, The
TariffAutonomy of China, in PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, 1929 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 313, 313. China then
lost control of her national Maritime Customs Administration to Great Britain through
treaties of 1898 and 1901. Id. China submitted to British extra-territorial legal
jurisdiction over certain of her port cities through the same 1842 and 1843 treaties,
after which other foreign powers demanded and received equal treatment in their trade
treaties with China. Mingchien Joshua Bau, The Relinquishment of Extra-
Territoriality in China, in PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, id. at 323, 323. See also, JOHN
KING FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 163-71 (4th ed. 1983). Japan
became subject to a similar regime of foreign extra-territorial rights and loss of tariff
rate autonomy through a series of treaties beginning in 1858, but unlike China, Japan
was able to end all extra-territorial rights by 1898, EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE
JAPANESE 78, 89 (1981), and reassert full tariff autonomy by 1911. Bau, The Tariff
Autonomy ofChina, id. at 321. Japan in turn was the first foreign power to demand
extra-territorial rights and fixed tariff rates from Korea, under the 1876 Treaty of
Kangwha. KI-BAIK LEE, A NEW HISTORY OF KOREA 268-69 (Edward W. Wagner et
al. trans., 1984). Western powers later obtained similar rights, though on terms
somewhat more generous to Korea. John Chay, The First Three Decades of
American-Korean Relations, 1882-1910, in U.S.-KoREAN RELATIONS 1882-1982,
at 15, 19-24 (Tae-Hwan Kwak et al. eds., 1982).
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achieving the accoutrements of a modem nation state and a high level
of industrialization. What makes Japan an even more attractive model
for its neighbors is that it has accomplished all this while preserving
much of its social stability and cultural identity.
In the economic sphere, of which international trade is a key
element for these nations, Japan achieved success through the
combination of a "strong" state and an interventionist industrial policy.
Taiwan and South Korea began to follow in Japan's footsteps after
World War II, and they now occupy a second development tier far
ahead of comparable countries in Asia.32 In each nation a strong state
has created an economic policy bureaucracy to implement a growth-
oriented industrial policy, with a premium on exports of manufactured
goods of steadily increasing technology and value-added. To assist
"infant" industries entering new fields of industry, and to conserve
scarce foreign exchange, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have all
been quite protectionist in certain areas.33 On the legal and
administrative side, all three nations adopted Continental civil law
legal systems, heavily influenced by German commercial law.34 These
code systems, which were superimposed upon existing neo-Confucian
societies, have since all been influenced to varying degrees by
American models. Viewing antidumping enforcement as a legalistic
expression of industrial policy, similarities in trading and legal regimes
would seem to favor convergence in antidumping enforcement among
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. On the other hand, economic and
32 I exclude Hong Kong and Singapore from consideration here not because their
governments have not played important roles in their economies, but because those
roles have not been in the capitalist development model of Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan.
" On Japan, see EDWARD J. LINCOLN, JAPAN'S UNEQUAL TRADE (1990). On South
Korea, see RicHARD LtrEDDE-NEuRATh, IMPORT CONTROLS AND EXPORT-ORIENTED
DEVELOPMENT (1986). On Taiwan, see WADE, supra note 30, at 126-39.
4 On Japan, see DAN F. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS AND
POLIcIEs 164-72 (1973). On South Korea, see SANG HYUN SOHN, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW AN LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA (1983). On Taiwan, see Man-Ling Li, The
Administrative Litigation System on Taiwan (1 980)(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School).
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political concerns specific to each nation may lead their antidumping
practices in different directions.
A. "Strong" States and the State-Private Distinction
In Weberian terms, the state is "a set of organizations invested
with the authority to make binding decisions for people and
organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to
implement those decisions using, if necessary, force."35 Writers on
Northeast Asian political economy commonly describe Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan as having "strong" or "hard" states, which can be
taken generally to mean states that are capable of:
1. formulating policy goals independently of particular
classes or groups within society ("insulation"),
2. coercively altering group or class behavior, and
3. intervening to change the structure of society, or to
substitute for other structures, such as the market.36
3 Ryan, supra note 30, at 5 (citing Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, The
State and Economic Transfornation, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 46 (Peter B.
Evans et al. eds., 1985).
36 This formula for assessing state "strength" appears in Stephen D. Krasner, US
Commercial and Monetaty Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength
and Internal Weakness, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICIES OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES 51-52 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1978).
An alternative formula is developed in JOEL MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK
STATES: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND STATE CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1988). On Japan, see Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic
Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 137
(Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987). On South Korea, see JUNG-EN Woo, RACE TO THE
SwFr: STATE AND FINANCE IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 1-6 (199 l)(citing Krasner
but discussing the potentially limiting nature of state-centered analysis). On Taiwan,
see WADE, supra note 30, at 337-42 (citing Migdal).
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This relative state strength in the economic sphere has allowed
governments in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to implement highly
interventionist industrial development policies, of which antidumping
policies are potentially an important part. It therefore may be useful
to explore the origins of Japan's strong state, and its role as the model
for states in South Korea and Taiwan.
In comparative historical context, one way to understand the
rise of the strong state in Asia and elsewhere is as a growth in the
power of the public sphere at the expense of private, or civil society.
Norberto Bobbio traces the "public / private" dichotomy in Western
political and social thought to Justinian's Corpus iuris (Institutiones,
1, 1, 4; Digesto, 1, 1, 1, 2)," but credits Kant with "bringing to its
conclusion" the historical evolution which finally located the sources
of public and private law in the state and the 'state of nature,'
respectively.38 According to Bobbio, this distinction provided the
theoretical basis for the liberal conception of states, as arising out of
private law contractual arrangements between free and equal actors
in the state of nature." This contractualist liberal tradition, which
includes Hobbes and Locke and may have achieved its zenith with
such nineteenth century writers as Herbert Spencer, celebrates the
primacy of the private over the public by arguing, in line with classical
economics, that the common good can be reduced to the sum of
individual welfare.4" In this view, the ideal of a "weak" state went
hand in hand with the "birth, growth and hegemony of the bourgeois
classes" in the nineteenth century.4
For later critics of the liberal conception, private law contract
was an inadequate explanation of the origins of state power. A
37 NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AN LIMITS OF
STATE POWER I (Paul Kennealy trans., 1989).
3s d. at7.
'9 Id. at 12.
40 HUDsoN, supra note 14, at 86.
41 BOBBIO, supra note 37, at 14. See also HUDSON, supra note 14, at 108-109
(connecting the rise of free trade in Britain with the adoption of laissez-faire principles
by industry and the rising middle classes).
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reaction against liberalism arose in the latter half of the nineteenth
century that called for a reassertion of the public over the private,
based on the Aristotelian and Hegelian belief that the common good
cannot be reduced to the sum of individual interests pursued in the
private sphere.42 This anti-liberal reaction, which could in theory take
democratic or autocratic forms, grew in influence through the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, precisely during the creation
of the modem Japanese state.
In the passages that follow, I argue that the Japanese state that
formed in the decades following the Meiji Restoration of 1868,4" was
in the heritage of this anti-liberal reaction. Though unlike its Western
counterparts, the Meiji state did not need to reassert itself over a
"hegemonic bourgeoisie" because such an economic class had not fully
developed in Japan at Meiji.44 Instead, Japan's leaders sought to
forestall the development of a powerful and independent capitalist
class, which they felt would lead to the alienated workers, social strife,
and threats of socialism they had witnessed in the West,45 and which,
probably not incidentally, would have rivalled the state for power.
According to Pyle, "It became an ideefixe of Japanese social policy
thought that the timing of Japan's industrialization gave her the
advantage of learning from Westerners' mistakes and thereby avoiding
421Id. at 14.
43 For a description of the Meiji Restoration see, infra, notes 50 to 91, and
accompanying text.
"' For a description of economic development in pre-Meiji Japan, see Sydney
Crawcour, The Tokugawa Period and Japan's Preparation for Modern Economic
Growth, in I THE JOURNAL OF JAPANESE STUDIES 113, (1974). Crawcour attributes
the dominant tendency to view traditional Japan as an obstacle to economic progress
partly to the influence of the European Historical School of economic development.
Id. A better known example of this view was expressed by Max Weber concerning
traditional China. MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND
TAOISM (Hans H. Gerth ed. & trans., 1951). Weber was an active member of the
Vereinfur Sozialpolitik, an influential group of German social scientists, which was
formed by economists of the German Historical School in 1872. Kenneth B. Pyle,
Advantages ofFollowership: Ge7nan Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890-
1925, in I THE JOURNAL OF JAPANESE STUDIES 127 (1974).
4 Pyle, supra note 44, at 143.
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or mitigating the social problems of industrialism."46 I argue that the
state developed by the Meiji oligarchs, which rejected laissez faire and
which embraced capitalism while distrusting capitalists, provided the
most important model for post-colonial governments in Korea and
Taiwan.47
It is important to note that in developmental/historical terms
the distinction here is not between the "liberal and framework state,"
characteristic of the nineteenth century, and the "managerial,
regulatory and welfare state," characteristic of post-World War I[
advanced capitalism,48 although the latter also involves a reassertion
of the public over the private. The vision of the state presented here
is essentially corporatist, meaning that "the state charters or creates a
small number of interest groups, giving them a monopoly of
representation of occupational interests in return for which it claims
the right to monitor them in order to discourage the expression of
'narrow,' conflictful demands. '49
B. The Meiji Restoration and Japan's Rise as a "Late Developing"
Industrial Power
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 is commonly seen as marking
the beginning of Japan's drive to become a modem nation state.50
46Id.
"' While it seems correct to emphasize the instrumental aims of Meiji leaders in
preventing the rise of class strife and possibly socialism, the rejection of laissez faire
in Confucian and neo-Confucian political thought certainly provided important
background support for a strong state in Japan (and later South Korea and Taiwan).
See LEONARD SHIHLIEN Hsu, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONFUCIANISM 157-59
(Curzon Press 1975)(1932).
4 Henry J. Steiner, Justification and Social Vision in Common Law Change 6 (July,
1983)(unpublished manuscript used in course materials for Sargentich, Theories
About Law, Spring Term, 1995).
41 WADE, supra note 30, at 27.
" For a detailed historical exposition see Crawcour, supra note 44 (discussing pre-
Meiji Restoration developments which helped provide the foundation for industrial
capitalism, and positing a transition phase from 1868 until roughly 1885).
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Those efforts, which laid the foundation for twentieth century Japan,
forced Japan's leaders (the "Meiji oligarchs") to make decisions which
have had lasting implications. Two of their most important decisions
were: i) to create a strong, centralized bureaucratic state, and ii) for
the state's duties to include the active promotion and guidance of
capitalist industrialization. The second objective, which has taken the
form of Japan's industrial policy, depends upon and thus cannot be
truly separated from the first. Industrial policy, of which I argue
antidumping enforcement is one facet, is an expression of and depends
upon the strong state.
1. Building the "Strong" State: Constitutional Monarchy. Civil
Law, and Powerful Bureaucracy.
Japan's political structure during the Tokugawa period (1600-
1868) has been described as one of "centralized feudalism." 51 Two
hundred to three hundred fiefdoms were ruled by vassal lords
("daimyo"), who were in turn subjects of the central military overlord,
or shogun. The position of shogun was hereditary, and in time the
shoguns became largely figureheads, as administration of the
government passed to a country-wide bureaucracy headed by two
councils of elders.52 During the Tokugawa period Japan's contacts
with the outside world, including Korea and China, were strictly
limited, as the nation embarked on "more than two centuries of self-
imposed seclusion.
'"5 3
By the mid-nineteenth century, Japan had witnessed China's
subjugation at the hands of the technologically advanced Western
powers, had lost its own tariff autonomy, and had been forced to
"' EDwnq O. REISCHAUER, THE J A'NSE 64-77 (1977). The following description of
Tokugawa Japan relies heavily on Reischauer.
52 Id. at 67.
531 d. at 68.
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accept foreign extra-territorial jurisdiction over certain of its ports. 4
In the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the Tokugawa shogunate was
overthrown and the Emperor "restored" to the throne, in fact rule
simply passed to the leaders of the two fiefdoms that had lead the
revolt.5" The Meiji oligarchs were driven to industrialize and
modernize Japan out of a general fear for the nation's sovereignty,
while the particular drive to adopt a Western legal system was given
added impetus by the fact that the Western powers made such a
system a prerequisite to them giving up their extraterritorial rights.56
As the Meiji oligarchs studied foreign political systems for
possible models, it was Prussian "constitutional monarchy" that they
found most applicable to their and Japan's situation. 7 In the
constitutional monarchy model the monarch would retain power over
the prime minister and the military, the imperial bureaucracy would
hold broad powers, and the parliament would be relatively weak.5" As
constitutional monarchy was implemented in Japan, the Meiji oligarchs
took the place of the monarch, and as they aged and passed from the
scene the bureaucracy, civilian and military, solidified its dominance
over the legislative branch.59 In adopting a modem legal system the
Continental civil law system was selected over the Anglo-American
common law, with particular codes showing either more German or
" See supra note 31, and accompanying text. As Chalmers Johnson points out,
because Japan did not recover tariff autonomy until 1911 her policy makers were
forced to seek alternative means to protect and nurture local industry. JOHNSON, supra
note 28, at 25.
55 JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 37.
56 HENDERSON, supra note 34.
57 JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 36. See also, JAMES M. WEST, EDUCATION OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN KOREA 7 (1991). For an exhaustive study of one German
advisor's role in the creation of the Meiji state, see JOHANNES SiEmEs, HERmAM
ROESSLER AND THE MAKING OF THE MEtn STATE; AN EXAMINATION OF HIS INFLUENCE
ON THE FOUNDERS OF MODERN JAPAN & THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE MEIJI
CONSTITUTION ACCOMPANIED BY His PERSONAL COMMENTARIES AND NOTES (1968).
58 SIEMES, supra note 57, at 19-20. See also, JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 36-38
(discussing implementation of the system in Japan).
59 JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 37-38.
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more French influence." Finally, a modem, bureaucratic civil service
was created on contemporary German lines. 6 Together, these three
consciously selected institutions provided a system of governance
capable of functioning with the autonomy that is at the heart of the
strong state.
2. Interventionist Economic Policy: The Influence of the German
Historical School of Economics.
The Meiji Restoration came at a time when the United States and
Germany were overtaking Great Britain as industrial powers, and
were doing so with interventionist trade regimes. 62  Theories
advocating free trade for developing countries were certainly known
to the Meiji oligarchs, but one of the advantages of being a "late
developer" is that under the right circumstances a nation may have the
latitude pick and choose among policies which others have tried.63 As
I have argued above, the Meiji state must be understood as part of a
historical anti-liberal reaction, which included a rejection of
liberalism's separation of politics and economics. Those conceptions
of state and economy which most influenced Meiji political and legal
structures contained, and were inseparable from, criticisms of
economic liberalism.
6 HENDERSON, supra note 34. For a detailed examination of the various codes, see
KENZO TAKAYANAGI, A Ceniury of Innovation: The Development of Law in Japan,
1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5(ARTHUR
T. VON MEHREN ed. 1963).
61 REISCHAUER, supra note 51, at 88-89.
62 AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 12-13 & n. 10. Although both were interventionist, the
United States was the more protectionist of the two in terms of its use of tariffs.
Goldstein, supra note 16, at 95.
63 ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIvE A BOOK OF ESSAYS (1962).
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a. The socio-economic component of the anti-liberal reaction:
the historical school in Germany and the United States.
Of direct importance to understanding Japan's subsequent
trade policies is the extent to which Meiji Japan's economic
modernization was influenced by the ideas of the Historical School of
Economics, then active in Germany." In broad terms the German
Historical School arose as a reaction to classical political economy,
and thus can be understood as part of the resurgent state movement.65
Historical economics began to emerge in Germany in the 1840s, but
did not constitute a true "school" until the emergence of the Younger
Historical School in the 1870s.6 It was the ideas of the Younger
Historical School, particularly as put forth by Gustav Schmoller, that
influenced Japan most directly.67 The fundamental tenets of the
Younger Historical School have been summarized as follows:
1. That economic life must be understood in light of
the particular society's culture, history, and stage of
development, thus rejecting universal economic
theories and instead emphasizing empirical and
historical research;
2. That "economic phenomena [are] organically
related to other social phenomena and therefore
An English Historical School developed during the same period, but from different
origins. ROGER BACKHOUSE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 212
(1985). Interestingly, Sir Henry Maine's jurisprudence, emphasizing history and
culture rather than rational principles, is considered one of the inspirations for
historical economics. Id. at 213.
6S Id. at212.
Id. at 219.
' Pyle, supra note 44, at 135. According to GOLDsTEIN, by the 1870s Schmoller was
the only well-known German academic advocating high tariffs. Goldstein, supra note
16, at 87. Like Weber, Sohmoller was influential in the Vereinfur Sozialpolitik, which
was "committed to drawing the working class away from revolutionary causes by a
policy of social reform." BACKIOUSE, supra note 64, at 219.
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economic research must maintain a close relationship
with the other social sciences";
3. The connection of economics and ethics,
emphasizing "the interest of the whole society, the
requirements of social harmony, national greatness,
and cultural creativity";
4. A view of the modem nation state as the highest
cultural institution, made up of a socially conscious
monarch and a professional bureaucracy strong
enough to mediate conflicts between social classes for
the common good;
5. Intervention by the state in economic and social
affairs to protect the legitimate interests of various
private actors for the good of the nation;
6. A rejection of universalist socialism in favor of
German solutions to social problems which would
"preserve the German institutions and ethics they
admired";
7. "Unabashed nationalism" and eventual support of
German imperialism.
68
In Germany, the Historical School provided economic support for the
6 Pyle, supra note 44, at 135-136. According to Pyle, in the 1890's Schmoller came
to link solution of Germany's social ills with national expansion, predicting that if
Germany failed to acquire overseas possessions the consequence would be "a lowering
of wages,... a proletarianization of the masses." Id. at 136 (quoting Abraham Ascher,
Professors as Propagandists: The Politics of the Kathedersozialisten, 23 JOuRNAL
OF CENTRALEuROPEAN AFFARS 282, 291 (1963)). It would be interesting to explore
the extent to which Japan's late nineteenth century and early twentieth century
militarism was influenced by Schmoller's ideas, or perhaps an intrinsic failure which
Schmoller recognized in the economic design he promoted.
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paternalistic 'state socialism' promoted by Bismark's constitutional
monarchy to combat revolutionary socialism. 69 In Japan, the influence
of the Historical School should also be seen as reinforcing the Meiji
oligarchs' choice of constitutional monarchy as the political form.70
According to Marxist historian Kohachiro Takahashi, "in Prussia and
Japan the erection of capitalism under the control and patronage of the
feudal absolute state was in the cards from the very first .... The socio-
economic conditions for the establishment of modem democracy were
not present; on the contrary capitalism had to make its way within an
oligarchic system - the 'organic' social structure - designed to suppress
bourgeois liberalism. "1
7'
The Historical School was also influential in the United States,
in part because the founders of the School were themselves influenced
by the writings of Freidrich List, the German-American political
economist, whose writings on strategic protectionism were influential
in nineteenth century America.' Toward the end of the nineteenth
century some influential American academics adopted the tenets of the
Historical School quite explicitly, including Richard Ely of Johns
Hopkins, who studied in Heidelberg with one of the School's leaders7'
Ely helped found the American Economic Association in 195 orn the
platform that:
" Pyle, supra note 44, at 132. Bismark combined "hard" approaches, such as anti-
socialist legislation, with "soft" social legislation that would rob radical socialism of
its raison d'etre. Id.
70 The relationship between politics and economics is not a simple one. Hermann
Roesler, a German law professor who seems to have greatly influenced the Meiji
Constitution and Commercial Code, was a supporter of constitutional monarchy for
Japan, yet was also an opponent ofBismark's rule. ShEMES, supra note 57, at 8. While
Roesler adhered to a theory of law, economy and society that rejected laissez faire
capitalism in favor of a more society-centered approach, his approach differed from
that of the Historical School of Schmoller. Id. at 4.
" Kohachiro Takahashi, A Contribution to the Discussion, in THE TRANsITION FROM
FEUDALISM To CAPITALIsM 68, 95-96 (1976).
7 Pyle, supra note 44, at 132.
7'Id. at 137.
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We regard the state as an educational and ethical
agency whose positive aid is an indispensable
condition of human progress. While we recognize the
necessity of individual initiative in industrial life, we
hold that the doctrine of laissez faire is unsafe in
politics and unsound in morals, and that it suggests an
inadequate explanation of the relations between the
state and the citizens.74
But whereas List emphasized the necessity of protectionist
state intervention to develop national industrial and technological
capabilities against outside threats," the Historical School seemed
more concerned with the purely domestic threat of social strife
resulting from a hegemonic bourgeoisie. This difference in emphasis
may represent the fact that List was writing from the prospective of
a developing America that as yet had not experienced the worst of
nineteenth century industrialization, whereas the economists of the
Historical School were either in Germany, where class conflict and
industrial strife arose somewhat earlier than in America, or were in
late nineteenth century America, which no longer believed in an
American "exceptionalism" from class conflict. In the American
context the Historical School can be understood as proposing an
alternative to Social Darwinism and the excesses of the Gilded Age,
which helped provide justification for progressive intervention in the
economy.76
7" Id. at 137 (quoted in HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880's, 234
(1950)).
75 HUDSON, supra note 14, at 246-48.
71 Pyle, supra note 44, at 137-138.
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b. Demonstrating the influence of the historical school
on Japan.
The ultimate influence of the Historical School on Japanese
economic and political thought is impossible to quantify, or even to
prove in any real sense, but there are several ways to explore its
possible influence. First, it may be useful to explore why Japanese
elites might have found the ideas of the Historical School more
appealing than liberalism, the major competing ideology. Like
Germany, Japan was trying to simultaneously industrialize and unify
a group of loosely organized political entities, and doing so in an
extremely hostile international environment. Second, an argument can
be made that central tenets of political and economic liberalism
conflict with basic ideals of Confucianism, which had become
increasingly influential during the Tokugawa period." The liberal
notion of an expansive private sphere consisting of formally equal
actors, interacting on the basis of freedom of contract, is
fundamentally inconsistent with Confucian ideals of society built upon
the harmony of stable, but essentially unequal, hierarchical
relationships.7" According to one scholar of Confucian political
philosophy, in classical Confucianism the state is part of society, and
is neither the product of a social contract, nor the creation of the
sovereign.79 One of the central functions of this embedded state is to
regulate wealth so as to avoid destabilizing inequalities, a clear
rejection of laissez faire." Finally, economic liberalism celebrates
economies built upon multiple transactions between formally equal
private actors, acting in their own self-interest. In this
acknowledgement, and perhaps celebration, of human greed, this
77 REISCHAUER, supra note 51, at 73.
' Ideal Confucian society would be organized according to the principle of li, which
can be seen as defining (i) hierarchical status relations within society, (ii) the duties
of individuals toward one another, and (iii) the duties of individuals toward to society.
Hsu, supra note 47, at 95-96.
-9 Id. at 30.
10 Id. at 157-58.
318 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERATATIONAL LAW [Vol.3
vision of humanity seems diametrically opposed to the Confucian
belief that human nature is fundamentally good.8" This is not to say
that Confucian and neo-Confucian 2 statecraft ever functioned
according to these ideals, because the Legalist and other cultural
traditions have been of great practical importance.8 3 However, to the
extent that Confucian ideals have become embedded in the moral
belief systems of the Japanese (and Korean and Chinese) people, the
basic precepts of classical liberalism may make it difficult for rulers
and the ruled to accept them as a legitimating, state-sanctioned
ideology.
A second approach to understanding the influence of the
Historical School is to identify particular Japanese economists and
politicians who came into contact with the School and adopted
elements of its platform in their own work in Japan. Pyle focuses on
the first generation of Western-influenced Japanese economists,
identifying Kanai Noburu (1865-1933) and Kuwata Kumazo (1868-
1932) as the two individuals most responsible for "introducing
German economic thought in the universities and implanting its
influence in the bureaucracy. '  In a more recent work, historian
Laura Hein focuses on three economists of the next generation,
Arisawa Hiromi (1896-1988), Nakayama Ichiro (1898-1980), and
Tsuru Shigeto (1912-), who were influential in both pre and post-war
" "At men's beginning their nature is fundamentally good, by nature they are similar
but in practice they grow apart." Three Character Classic, quoted in Fairbank, supra
note 3 1, at 67.
2 The term "neo-Confucian" is used here to describe the variant of Confucianism
that became dominant in China during the Song dynasty (907-1279), and remained the
state-sanctioned ideology through the nineteenth century. FAIRBANK, supra note 31,
at 65-68. The neo-Confucianism espoused in particular by Zhu Xi became dominant
in Korea during the Yi (Choson) dynasty (1392-1910), DAE-Kyu YOON, LAW AND
POLmC AAUo~hrr iN Sourm KOREA 5-12 (1990), and was also influential, though
to a lesser degree, in Tokugawa Japan. REiSCH-AUER, supra note 51, 72-74.
' For a discussion of "imperial Confucianism" as a mixture of Legalist, Confucian,
and other influences in the Chinese context, see FAiRBANK, supra note 31, at 60-62,
117-39.
' Pyle, supra note 44, at 139.
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Japan." According to Hein, "Many of the fundamental assumptions
of these thinkers reflected the spirit of several other schools of
Western economic thought-neither Marxist nor neoclassical.""' Chief
among these other schools of thought were the German social-policy
school and the American institutional school, both of which have roots
in the Historical School.
A third approach is taken by Johnson in MITI and the
Japanese Miracle, which asserts the influence of the Historical School
on Japan,88 but doesn't seek to prove the assertion through
comparisons between the theories of the Historical School and Japan's
actual political economy. Rather, Johnson describes in great detail the
relationship between state and economy in Japan's post-war economic
development, seeking to make that relationship comprehensible to an
American audience accustomed to equating strong, interventionist
states with Soviet-style command economies.8 9 Johnson discusses the
Historical School and Bismark's constitutional monarchy separately,
focusing on the effectiveness of the latter for separating power and
authority, or "ruling" and "reigning," and thus contributing to the
autonomy, or strength of the state.90
This discussion of the Historical School is relevant for
understanding Japan's present antidumping practice because it shows
the depth of anti-liberal economic and political thinking that would
have had to have been overcome for liberal ideology to become
' Laura E. Hein, In Search of Peace and Democracy: Japanese Economic Debate
in Political Context, 53 JoURNAL. OF ASIAN S'r-NmEs 752 (1994).
Id. at 755.
Id. at 755-756. Hein finds some disagreement among the three economists over the
ideal strength of the state, but believes that at least two of the three accepted the strong
state. Id. at 756.
' "Japan's political economy can be located precisely in the line of descent from the
German Historical School." JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 17.
1 Although the thrust of MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE is to describe the post-war
structures of the Japanese economy, rather than to explore its basis in the Historical
School or in nineteenth century Prussian state-craft, Johnson does cite "Bismark's
personal influence on a few key Meiji leaders." JoHNsoN, supra note 28, at 36.
9 Id.
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dominant in Japan. If liberal ideology is not now dominant in Japan,
and if Japan has provided the economic and political model for post-
World War II South Korea and Taiwan, then one needs to understand
antidumping enforcement in these nations in a non-liberal
framework.9' Because liberalism or neo-liberalism has been the
mainstream American ideology for several decades, and because the
GATT is based upon essentially liberal principles, the standard
American paradigm for understanding antidumping law may be
insufficient for understanding antidumping enforcement in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan.
3. Development of Industrial Policy Pre-World War II.
Although Johnson and others trace modem Japan's industrial
policy institutions to reforms of the 1920s and 1930s,92 in the area of
international trade, Japan's interventionist policies appear to have been
functioning by the early 1900s. As a contemporary observer wrote of
Japan, "Here we find, for the first time in modern civilization, a great
government extensively operating as a business corporation, and
including under its direct control and supervision all activities which
enter into the proposition."'93 To control international trade flows to
serve national development goals, Japan reportedly employed certain
"legitimate" devices including protective tariffs, subsidies, financial
support, free transportation of products, rebates and bonuses on
exports, and organization and centralization under Government
direction.' In addition, Japan was accused of employing "illegitimate"
I
9' According to one author, Japan is not alone among leading industrialized nations
in not accepting liberal free trade theory as a governing paradigm for trade policy, but
is joined in this respect by France, Italy, and perhaps Germany. Winfried Ruigrok,
Paradigm Crisis in International Trade Theory, 25 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 77,
78 n.2 (1991). Of course, a rejection of free trade as a governing ideology does not
necessarily lead to protectionism, as has been shown by Germany's high levels of
intra-industry trade. Id. at 86.
92 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 114; Cumings, supra note 30, at 12.
93 MILLARD, supra note 3, at 16.
9' Id. at 30-3 1. Note the expansive definition of "legitimate" government action.
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methods including secret remission of taxes and duties (presumably
meaning Japanese government reimbursement of charges imposed by
importing nations on Japanese exports), secret rebates of
transportation charges, exercise of military and political authority to
handicap competitors, and imitation and counterfeiting of competing
articles.9" Writing of Japanese government involvement in the cotton
textile trade, a United States consular report stated:
The Government sustains this industry; first, by
protective tariff; second, by organizing a trust for
marketing the goods; third, by advancing money to
carry on the enterprise at 4/ per cent. interest; fourth
by cheap rates of transportation on lines controlled by
the Government. With these various methods of
support it is clear that foreign cotton manufacturers
expecting to hold their trade in the Orient must meet
practically the Government of Japan as a competitor.
I am fully convinced that this governmental policy will
not only continue, but will be expanded to cover many
other lines of industrial development.96
Although from the 1880s the Japanese government had begun
reducing its reliance on direct ownership of industry,97 one can clearly
see in these passages dating from the early 1900s the origins of the
strategic, interventionist, trade policy pioneered by Japan and later
adopted by South Korea and Taiwan. Japan had made a colony of
Taiwan following its 1895 war with China, and was gradually
increasing its control over Korea prior to full annexation in 1910.
95 Id. at 31.
Quoted in MiLLARD, id. at 32.
9 According to Johnson, most direct Japanese government investment in mines,
railroads, arsenals and factories took place prior to the Matsukata Reforms of 1880,
after which the government began nurturing private industry by directing investment
to strategic industries, providing exclusive licenses, and in some cases, providing
capital funding. JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 84-85.
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Taiwan and Korea thus became integrated into the economic empire
being built by the Japanese state.
World War I set off an economic boom in Japan, as exports
increased to supply the warring countries, and as imports of advanced
goods such as chemicals declined, giving indigenous producers an
opportunity to develop.9" This boom was followed in the 1920s by
economic and trade stagnation, which lead to the first attempts at
industrial policy in its modem, institutionalized form, in which the
state is neither the direct commander, nor the mere regulator of the
economy." Some of these initial attempts failed as Japan became
increasingly militaristic in the 1930s, when the state increased its
dominance over the private sphere by moving toward direct control
of industry.1" Militarism aside, however, the 1930s are seen as the
period of institutional innovation from which modem Japanese
industrial policy arose."1
4. Post-War Continuity.
The essential continuity between Japan's pre and post-World
War II economic policies is now well documented. In spite of the
legal and economic reforms imposed by the Supreme Command Allied
Powers ("SCAP") in the immediate post-war years, by the mid-1950s
the furthest reaching of these reforms were being reversed or
emasculated."° Leaving to one side the question of whether reshaping
9 Id. at 89-90.
"' Id. at 114. For a description of institutional changes during the first years of this
"new testament" period of Japan's industrial policy, see id. at 100- 115.
' Id. at 114-15.
,01 Id. at 308; Cumings, supra note 30, at 12-16 (pointing to the 1 930s for the birth
of both the Northeast Asian regional economy, and Japanese economic policy).
Cumings sees in 1930s Japan the model for later state-led development in Taiwan and
South Korea. Id. at 15.
,0, On securities law, see Alan L. Beller et al., Looks Can Be Deceiving--A
Comparison of hIitial Public Offering Procedures under Japanese and U.S.
Securities Laws, 55 LAW AND CoNrMP. PROBS. 77 (1992); Dan Fenno Henderson,
Foreign Takeover ofJapanese Corporations, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AND
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Japan into a liberal, regulatory state would have been a legitimate role
for the SCAP, such an essential reshaping never occurred. Indeed, the
argument is made that because pre-war challengers for power such as
the zaibatsu and the military were severely weakened during the
occupation, the fact that bureaucracy emerged basically intact left the
Japanese state more autonomous than before World War 11.103
Whether or not this is correct, the role of the state in Japan's post-
World War II economy has been strong. Despite the intervening
decades, this state strength is best understood as descended from
decisions taken during the early decades of modem Japan, which
rejected liberalism as a governing economic or political paradigm.
The following sections explore Japan's role as a model for
state-economy relations in South Korea and Taiwan in their post-
World War II development. If Japan has indeed provided the basic
model for state industrial policies in these nations, then a common
framework may exist for understanding the antidumping policies of
these three nations.
C. South Korea's Emergence as a Modern Nation State
The following section traces the history of the modem South
Korean state, and will attempt to show that, in the areas which affect
international trade, the state-economy relationship in Korea is very
similar to that in Japan.
1. 1876 to 1910: The End of the Confucian Order.
Through much of the nineteenth century Korea maintained its
traditional Confucian monarchy and its political status as a tributary
of Qing China. Though aware of the Western powers' incursions into
ERA oF INATONALIzATION 89 (liroshi Oda ed., 1994). On antitrust, see Johnson,
supra note 28, at 175, 221-27. On labor regulation, see KAzuo SUGENO, JAPANESE
LABOR LAW 8-10 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992); KAREL VON WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA
OF JAPANESE POWER 67-71 (1989).
103 Cumings, supra note 30, at 21.
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China,"' 4 as well as Japan's nationalist industrial modernization, 105
Korea's leaders failed to adopt a strategy capable of ensuring the
country's independence. Proponents of a Korean "Enlightenment" had
called for an opening to foreign trade and foreign learning since the
late eighteenth century,"° but the government instead pursued
isolation. By the time more forward-looking leadership took power
in 1873, Japan was already too far down the path of aggressive
nationalist "modernization" to leave the weaker Korea in peace.
Exhibiting a remarkable facility with international law as practiced by
the Western powers, Japan used an orchestrated naval "incident" to
force the 1876 Treaty of Kangwha upon Korea. 0 7 The Treaty was a
turning point for Korea, in part because it opened three treaty ports
to Japanese extraterritorial jurisdiction, but also because it was the
first instance of Korea receiving modern legal recognition as a
sovereign nation." 8 After the Treaty of Kangwha, missions were sent
to Japan and China to study modernization efforts there. Prompted
by the reports he received, King Kojong began serious reforms of the
government and military in 1880 and 1881. These efforts triggered a
wave of reaction from conservative Confucian forces, however, and
a military revolt in 1882 forced King Kojong to return defacto control
of the government to the conservatives." 9 During the revolt a
Japanese military instructor was killed and the Japanese minister of
legation was forced to flee the country."0
This conservative revolt was a crucial point for modem Korea
because Japan's plans for a military reprisal lead China to send in
troops to assert its interests."' If Kojong and Queen Min had not
been forced to give up reform efforts it is possible that Korea could
'0 4KI-BAI LEE, A NEW HISTORY OF KOREA 263 (Edward W. Wagner trans., 1984).
loS Id. at 266.
106 Id. at 267.
107 Id. at 268.
" Id. at 269. Japan's later aggression toward Korea suggests that Japan's recognition
of Korean sovereignty was aimed at countering China's claims to suzerainty.
'09 Id. at 272-73.
110 Id.
1" Id. at 273-75.
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have modernized while maintaining some autonomy from both China
and Japan. As it turned out, for the next three decades Korea was a
stage on which territorial rivalries between China, Russia and Japan
were played out, at great cost to Korea. With Japan's victory over
China in the Sino-Japanese War Korea came under Japan's defacto
control in 1894."1. Japan's control was tightened after its victory over
Russia in 1905, when Japan forced Korea to accept the "Protectorate
Treaty," under which Japan assumed control over Korea's external
relations.113 Finally, in 1910 a comprehensive annexation treaty was
concluded and Korea ceased to exist as a sovereign nation." 4
In 1894, though still retaining some formal independence,
Korea was forced by Japan to institute reforms of its legal and
political institutions. Known as the Kab-o reforms, these measures
introduced a separation of judicial and administrative functions, as
well as a nation wide system of courts. 5 The system imposed by
Japan was quite naturally influenced by the statist system adopted in
Meiji Japan just a few years earlier." 6 Although the laws enacted
during the Kab-o reforms were abrogated in 1910 by the Japanese
colonial government, they provided an important precedent for
Korea's later assimilation of Japanese law.
2. 1910 to 1945: The Colonial Period.
During the colonial period (1910-1945) Korea was heavily
influenced by the contemporary society of Japan. In addition to its
obvious influence as the colonial ruler, it appears in retrospect that
during this period Japan was able to usurp China's traditional role as
the model for Korean statecraft. By virtue of geography and shared
culture Korea is uniquely situated to evaluate developments in China
11. The Treaty of Shimonoseki which ended the Sino-Japanese War included in its
first article a recognition of Korea's sovereign status. Id. at 289.
3 Id. at 309-11.
114 Id. at 313.
115 WEST, supra note 57, at 6.
" 6 Id. at7.
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and Japan. At a time when Korean exposure to the West was limited,
Japan's rapid development presented an obvious contrast to China's
disintegration and civil war, in spite of the fact that Japan had chosen
the imperialist path.
3. Independence and the Rhee Regime.
By August of 1945, when U.S. troops took the Japanese
surrender in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, the lines of the
Cold War were being drawn. Complex political maneuvering
continued over the next three years, both inside Korea and
internationally, until in 1948 a conservative government took power
and the Republic of Korea was declared in the South." 7 The new
president was Syngman Rhee, a conservative independence leader
who had been living in the United States for many years, and who
received at least the initial blessing of the American occupation
government."' Rhee remained in power in South Korea from 1948
until 1960, and although his regime has been criticized as corrupt,
undemocratic, and ineffective, recent scholarship has shown that at
least some economic measures taken during these years served
important purposes.' Of most importance for understanding current
South Korean economic and trade policy is that Rhee rejected political
and economic liberalism in favor of a strong state and an
interventionist trade policy.
Rhee's trade policy is generally characterized as one of import
substitution ("ISI") rather than the export oriented policy of later
years, and it is argued that he was able to pursue ISI over the
117 LEE, supra note 104, at 379. For histories of these years see, BRUCE CUMINGS,
ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, Volumes I & II (1981, 1990); GREGORY HENDERSON,
KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEX 113-82 (1968).
118 HENDERSON, supra note 117, at 128-29, 151-62.
"' Woo, supra note 36, at 43-72. Many criticisms of the Rhee regime parallel those
levelled against the China's Nationalist regime during World War II, when that
obviously corrupt regime was able to parlay its status as an ally against Japan and
against communism into enormous sums of American aid. BARBARA W. TucHMAN,
STILLWELL AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA (197 1).
1996-97] STATES, INDUSTIAL POLICIES& ANTIDUMPING 327
objections of his American benefactors by exploiting a fundamental
contradiction in American policy. American development theory of
the 1950s called for a small state, which would leave direction of the
economy to market forces, while America's geopolitical design for
Northeast Asia called for South Korea to be a market for Japanese
exports.12 What allowed Rhee to parry these two prongs of
America's agenda was a third prong, which was America's military
need to have South Korea as a strong ally against communism. 21 This
military reality arguably allowed Rhee the breathing space to
implement ISI and anti-Japanese policies of which his American
advisers disapproved, without being punished with a cutoff of United
States aid.'22
4. Park Chung Hee and the Turn to Export Oriented Development.
The toppling of the Rhee regime by student demonstrations in
1960 opened the door for the 1961 coup d'etat lead by Park Chung
Hee. The Park regime, which lasted until Park's assassination in 1979,
brought into being the strong South Korean state that continues to
this day. Park was an eclectic nationalist, who graduated from the
Japanese Army's military academy in Manchuria (Manchukuo),12' rose
to the rank of lieutenant in the Japanese Kwantung Army,'24 was
detained for participating in a violent local rebellion against the Rhee
government in the 1940s,"2' and was suspected by the CIA of being a
communist. 126 As Park's background would suggest, the fact that he
was on the political Right did not mean that he believed in laissez faire
politics or liberal economics. Park was very public in his admiration
120 Woo, supra note 36, at 47-48.
121 Id. at 48.
122 Id.
'2 MARTINHART-LANDSBERG, THE RUSH TO DEvELOPMENT: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND
POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN SOUTH KOREA 138-39 (1993).
124 Woo, supra note 36, at 40.
123 CUMINGS, II ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, supra note 117, at 266 & n.75.
"2 s Woo, supra note 36, at 79 & n.22. See also CUMINGS, II ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN
WAR, supra note 117, at 266 & n.75.
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for the Meiji Restoration, and his desire to create a similar state-
society order in Korea. 2 '
Park benefitted from the land reform carried out under
American pressure during the Rhee regime, which eliminated any
possibility of a landlord class that might challenge his government's
power.128 Shortly after taking power, Park moved to eliminate
another potential private-sector power base, the independent
entrepreneurs who had become wealthy off the rents available under
Rhee's corrupt economic system."" After arresting a number of these
"illicit profiteers" and threatening them with prosecution, Park
brought them into the state's embrace by releasing them in exchange
for shares in private companies they were encouraged to establish.'3
Park also nationalized South Korea's banks, thus beginning the state
control over capital and finance that has not completely ended
today.
1 31
It was during the early part of Park's rule that South Korea
committed itself to export promotion, and American writers on South
Korean development often explain the Park regime's success as an
acceptance of market-oriented policies, as opposed to the import-
substitution policies of the Rhee regime. In fact, as several writers
cited in this paper have shown, although Park's policies were both
different from and more successful than Rhee's, the differences were
not simply "market" vs. "non-market." The important contribution of
the Park regime, which lasts to this day, was a South Korean state
built around economic and trade institutions modelled on those of pre-
World War II Japan.1
32
..7 AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 14, 51-52; HART-LANDSBERG, supra note 123, at 138-
39.
128 AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 37-38, 147.
129 Woo, supra note 36, at 83-84.
130 Id. at 84. On this episode, see also AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 72.
'3' Woo, supra note 36, at 84; AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 72-73.
132 For a list of some of the parallel institutions, see HART-LANDSBERG, supra note
123, at 138-40.
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D. Taiwan's Emergence as the Republic of China
The following section traces the history of Taiwan and its
government, and will attempt to show that in areas affecting
international trade policy, the state-economy relationship in Taiwan is
also very similar to that in Japan.
1. Formation of the Guomindang ("KMT") and its Mainland China
Period.
Like their Korean counterparts, the rulers of post-World War
II Taiwan had also witnessed Japan's rise into a modem nation state
capable of dealing on equal terms with the Western powers. Taiwan's
situation differed from South Korea's however, in that Taiwan's post-
colonial government, the KMT, had been in existence since roughly
1910, and had governed at least parts of the Mainland under the
leadership of Chiang Kai Shek since the 1920s.
133
To this day the KMT pays homage to the political philosophy
of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, which was influenced more by Bismark's
Germany or Meiji Japan than by liberal models.13 ' Dr. Sun rejected
federalism, advocated by some as a solution to China's fragmentation,
and became disillusioned with prospects for a Western parliamentary
system in China. 135 He argued instead for a dictatorship under a
vanguard party, 13 and in the early 1920s received Comintern
assistance in reorganizing the KMT along Leninist lines. 137 Legal
reform in the last years of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) had been
heavily influenced by Meiji Japan, both through Chinese students
studying in Japan, and through Japanese legal experts employed by the
Chinese government. 38 Dr. Sun continued this emphasis on Japanese
13 FAMBANK, supra note 31, at 222, 235-43.
,3' WADE, supra note 30, at 257-58.
135 FAiRBANK, supra note 31, at 225-26.
136 WADE, supra note 30, at 230.
137 FuARBANK, supra note 31, at 237-39.
13' Li, supra note 34, at 70-76.
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legal models by appointing Japanese jurists to act as legal advisors
when he became head of a Nanjing provisional government in 1912.139
In the economic sphere, Dr. Sun advocated a strong role for the state,
including "state operation of industries, state control of capital, and
state ownership of profits.0 40 But although he emphasized the need
to develop national capital, Dr. Sun also advocated private ownership
over small enterprises in competitive markets. 141
Dr. Sun Yat Sen died in 1925, and by 1927 Chiang Kai Shek
had consolidated his leadership over the KMT.1 41 Chiang maintained
the Leninist structure of the KMT, and under his leadership, party and
state essentially merged.14 3 In 1930s the KMT also had extensive
contacts with the fascist governments in Germany and Italy, some of
whose tactics it consciously emulated.1 4 Without carrying this line of
analysis too far, it does seem clear that the KMT leadership were
predisposed toward the kind of strong state necessary, but not
sufficient, to carry out state capitalist development in the Japanese
model. In the economic sphere, Chiang opposed Western liberalism
for its predilection against government interference in economic life,
and proposed instead an eclectic "anti-Marxist Confucian
totalitarianism," that would merge Confucian social values with
Western technology.
145
"' Id. at 7 1.
140 H.C. Tai, The Kuomintang and modernization in Taiwan, in AUTHORITARIAN
POLITICs IN MODERN SOCIETY (S. Huntington and C. Moore eds.)(1 970), cited in
WADE, supra note 30, at 258.
141 WADE, id.
142 FAIRBANK, supra note 3 1, at 241.
141 Stephan Haggard and Chien-Kuo Pang, The Transition to Export-Led Growth in
Taiwan, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN TAiwAN's DEVELOPMENT 47, 48 (Joel D.
Aberbach ed., 1994). See also FAiRBANK, supra note 31, at 246-47 (on "Party
Dictatorship").
144 FAirnANi, supra note 31, at 252-53.
14' Id. at 253-54.
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2. Taiwan's Colonial Development.
Japan's colonization of Taiwan must be condemned, but as was
the case in Korea, the colonial period left Taiwan with some attributes
which were conducive to economic development once liberation
came.146 As Bruce Cumings points out, Japan was one of the few
colonizers that located modem heavy industry in its colonies, building
steel, chemical, and hydroelectric facilities in Korea, Manchuria, and,
to a lesser degree in Taiwan. 47 Taiwan's main colonial role, however,
was to be a "bread basket" for Japan, and it was in agriculture that
Japan's colonial policies left Taiwan best prepared for economic
development under the KMT.
148
3. The KMT in Taiwan.
When the KMT set up in Taiwan in 1948 and 1949,
circumstances seemed to converge to push it toward further emulation
of Japan's economic and trade policies. Many saw the Mainland KMT
as "weak" and riddled with corruption, which prevented its economic
planners from carrying out land reform and other necessary
modernizing measures, and ultimately contributed to its loss to the
communists.1 49 Taiwan, emerging from the colonial period, did not
have an entrenched economic elite capable of challenging the
government, and by carrying out land reform and other measures the
KMT guaranteed that any such loci of independent economic power
would not develop for some time. 50 The KMT's economic planners
knew that they had been unable to implement much needed reforms
" Alice Amsden, Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge
to Dependency Theory, S MODERN CHINA 341 (1979).
' Cumings, supra note 30, at 12-13.
'4 Haggard and Pang, supra note 143, at 52.
149 See, e.g., FAiRBANK, supra note 31, at 343-49; General Joseph W. Stillwell,
Solution in China (Probably July, 1944), in THE STILLWELL PAPERS 321-22 (Theodore
H. White ed., 1948); Haggard & Pang, supra note 143, at 50-51.
"' Haggard & Pang, supra note 143, at 48, 52-58.
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while on the Mainland because the KMT was too greatly "penetrated"
by landlords, big city capitalists, and others.' Once on Taiwan, the
decision was made that such interests would be prevented from
"capturing" state policy making to the extent they had on the
Mainland. In order to do this a strong state was necessary, not a
corrupt, "weak" dictatorship.
As in South Korea, the legacy of Japanese colonization left the
native Taiwanese with language, educational and cultural ties to Japan
that continued in the post-colonial era. In addition, by the late 1940's
the Cold War order was taking shape in North Asia, and the KMT,
like the Rhee government in South Korea, could invoke the threat of
communism to cut short pressure from the United States for greater
democracy. 52 As we have seen, by this time the SCAP occupation
government in Japan was already backing off from its earliest post-
war attempts to establish a more liberal democratic order, and in
South Korea the Rhee government was capitalizing on the Cold War
for breathing space to implement its agenda.1
3
4. Taiwan's Industrial Policy in the 1950s.
On Taiwan, the KMT took over the centralized administrative
structure left by the Japanese, and to strengthen its economic
governance established a number of powerful economic agencies
, ' WADE, supra note 30, at 260.
112 The following description of the internally divided United States policy toward the
KMT in the 1940s could easily have been written of the Rhee regime:
Actually we had a divided objective: to press the KMT leaders into
reform which would diminish their autocratic power and facilitate
internal peace; at the same time to strengthen the KMT-controlled
regime as a step toward political stability in East Asia. We became
involved in continuing to build up the KMT dictatorship materially
at the same time that we tried to get it to tear itself down politically.
FMARBANK, supra note 3 1, at 343-44.
'5' See supra notes 1 18-22 and accompanying text.
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which exist to this day."5 4 Like South Korea in the 1950s, Taiwan's
industrial policy began with a period of import substitution which
lasted through the 1950s. Political economists point to the year 1958
as a turning point for Taiwan's economy, when the KMT seems to
have given up its goal of recapturing the Mainland, and turned to
economic growth as its main objective.15 1 In the late 1950s and early
1960s, as in South Korea, broad import substitution was replaced by
the combination of export promotion and selective protection that
lasts to this day.1 6 As in Park Chung Hee's South Korea, pre-World
War II Japan appears to have provided the inspiration for much of
Taiwan's subsequent economic and trade regime.157 A fundamental
difference between South Korea and Taiwan, however, is that the
KMT was influenced by the Japanese and other economic models both
as the government of the Mainland, where it attempted to implement
some of its own reforms, and later as the government of Taiwan.
E. "Strong" States and the Capitalist Development Model
The existence of a strong state does not indicate that the state
will use its power to intervene in the economy, or what form that
intervention will take if it does occur. Thomas Biersteker has
identified the following six forms that state intervention can take:
influencing, regulating, mediating, distributing or redistributing,
producing goods and/or services, or planning."5 8 Having determined
that strong states exist in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and having
chronicled the influence of Japan's development model on South
Korea and Taiwan, it is necessary to look at specific aspects of the
industrial policies of these nations that can be expected to influence
54 Hagghrd & Pang, supra note 143, at 61-65; WADE, supra note 30, at 195-217.
ISS Haggard & Pang, supra note 143, passim.
116 Id. at 47.
157 WADE, supra note 30, at 189, 326, 334-35; Cumings, supra note 30.
"' Thomas J. Biersteker, Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A
Conceptual Exploration ofIMF and World Bank Prescriptions, 34 INT'L STUD. Q.
477,480 (1990).
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antidumping enforcement.
IV. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STYLIZED EAST ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT STATE, AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
FOR ANTIDUMPING ENFORCEMENT
Once Park Chung Hee consolidated his power in South Korea
in the early 1960s it was possible to say that Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan were all consciously following a state-lead capitalist
development path that Japan had embarked upon before World War
II. Described by Johnson as the "capitalist development state," the
model holds up well for each of the countries described here. In spite
of national differences in policy and in emphasis, Robert Wade sums
up the economic policy array well when he writes,
Since Japan was the 'textbook' for Taiwan and Korea,
it is no surprise that it shows the same array of
governed market elements: redistributivist land reform,
postreform ownership ceilings, restrictions on financial
institutions, a bank-based financial system able to
sustain high debt/equity ratios, exchange rate controls,
protection, direct foreign investment controls, export
promotion, and selective government leadership in
investment and technology. '59
The following are elements of this stylized East Asian development
state, found to some degree in each of the nations studied here, which
might be expected to have implications for antidumping policy and
enforcement.
9 WADE, supra note 30, at 326.
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A. Strong and Relatively Insulated National Economic and Trade
Bureaucracies
Japan's economic and trade bureaucracy has been the subject
of the most comment, however Korea and Taiwan have their
functional equivalents."6 Although the names and the duties of the
various ministries shift over time, the important implication for
antidumping policy remains the same. Each nation has created
bureaucratic institutions which oversee international trade in
connection with broader economic planning. These institutions are
more powerful than any potential equivalent in the United States
system, and to this point have been relatively isolated from popular
politics.' As we shall see, the antidumping regimes of Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan are for the most part implemented by these
institutions and their career bureaucrats. I argue that the economic
bureaucrats of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have relied, and
arguably still rely, on Historical School and Listian economic thinking
in implementing capitalist development policies. Although industrial
policies involve complex webs of interconnected and mutually
reinforcing policies, the following are three such policies which are
potentially relevant to antidumping administration.
B. Capital Shortages Leading to Encouraged Savings and Directed
Credit to Strategic Industries
Each of these nations faced serious capital shortages in the
early stages of development, which lead each government to became
160 The most comprehensive account of Japan's economic bureaucracy remains
JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 28. For a more critical
account, see KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 109-58
(Vintage Books 1990)(1989). On South Korea, see HART-LANDSBERG, supra note
123, at 48-55, 139-40. On Taiwan, see WADE, supra note 30, at 195-217.
"6 It is interesting to note the central role engineers, as opposed to Western-trained
economists, have played in at least two of these bureaucracies. On Japan, see
JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 25-26. On Taiwan, see WADE, supra note 30, at 219-20.
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involved in directing financing toward "strategic" industries, often
those with export potential. 62 In Taiwan and South Korea, where the
state owned the banks, this was easy; in Japan it was accomplished
through coordinated "administrative guidance" by the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.16 3 To
the extent that decisions to direct credit and to grant antidumping
relief both involve judgments about the importance and the viability of
the company or industry in question ("picking winners"), this suggests
that those who enforce the antidumping laws of Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan will be unlikely to oppose antidumping relief on
ideological grounds, as being an improper use of government power
to pick winners.
C. Protection of Strategic Domestic Industries
Protection, tariff or non-tariff, takes many forms, and can be
applied broadly or selectively. Protection can be implemented through
broad measures, such as tariffs, foreign exchange controls and import
licensing requirements, which are often used to preserve scarce
foreign exchange, or can be targeted to nurture "strategic" industries.
Protection can take the form of ad hoc measures enacted in response
to specific political demands, or can result from formal, quasi-legal
proceedings such as antidumping or safeguard actions. The hallmark
of protection in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan is that it has generally
been neither universal, such as in import substitution regimes, nor the
adhoc result of pressures from political constituents. Protection has
been one of the tools available to economic planners implementing
capitalist development policies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and
in this sense protectionism in these nations should be understood
primarily as strategic, Listian protectionism, though such
62 On Japan, see Kozo Yamamura & Jan Vandenberg, Japan's Rapid-Growth Policy
on Trial, in LAW ANDTRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESEECONOMY 238, 240-42 (Gary
R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986). On Taiwan, see WADE, supra note
30, at 165-172. On Korea, see Woo, supra note 36.
63Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 162, at 240-41.
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protectionism can certainly coexist alongside "interest group"
protectionism of the sort common in the United States. 164 In the case
of Japan, this strategic protectionism has been connected to low levels
of intra-industry trade, 65 which have been the focus of complaints
from trading partners."
One of the major arguments against protection, whether in the
form of antidumping duties or otherwise, is that it redistributes wealth
from consumers, who must pay higher prices, to the producers who
receive protection. Two assumptions underlying this critique are i)
that the interests of consumers and producers can be defined and
weighed separately, and ii) that redistribution by government policy
is bound to be inefficient from an economic standpoint compared to
distribution by market forces. Both of these assumptions are founded
on liberal as opposed to Historical School or Listian views of the
economy, and as such cannot be expected to be followed dogmatically
in Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. What in fact seems more plausible
is that economic and trade bureaucrats in these nations behave, and
164 On List and Japan, see RICHARD SAMUELS, "RICH NATION, STRONG ARMY":
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN 7
(1994)(stating that "Japanese ideas about the relationship between wealth and might,
... are more consonant with Listian neomercantilism than with Smithian liberalism").
On South Korea, see LUtEDDE-NEuRATH, supra note 33 (positing List as an early
development economist, then demonstrating the Listian protectionism of South Korea's
trade regime). On the strategic role of protection in Taiwan, see WADE, supra note 30,
at 136-37.
161 Intra-industry trade is the import-export flow of similar products. Japan's exports
of manufactured goods have shown extraordinary growth, which in other industrialized
countries has been accompanied by increased imports of manufactured goods. Japan's
manufactured imports have not kept pace however, with the result being that Japan's
levels of intra-industry trade in manufactured goods are far below those of the United
States, Germany, or France. LINCOLN, supra note 33, at 47.
16 The concern is that Japan is engaged in strategic protection of its manufacturing
industries to assist their export efforts. Id. at 92-94. It seems likely that South Korea
and Taiwan aspire to such trading patterns, but at present they still need to import
machine tools and manufactured inputs for the products they export, and these imports
come primarily from Japan. For a discussion of the origins and seemingly perpetual
nature of this problem for Taiwan and South Korea, see Cumings, supra note 30.
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will continue to behave, as though consumers, in spite of paying
higher than necessary prices, will benefit along with the society in
general from the protection of domestic production and employment.
Such policies are not necessarily inconsistent with utilitarian notions
of pursuing the greatest good for the greatest number, but they are
arguably based on longer term and more dynamic views of
comparative advantage than liberal economics.
D. Ambivalence toward Foreign Direct Investment and Reliance on
Controlled Technology Licensing
Each of these nations has sought to develop its own industries,
meaning industries owned by its nationals rather than industries simply
located within its borders. This reflects a view, now contested by
some, 67 that local ownership and control of industry is important for
the long term well being of a nation. Yet as Amsden and others have
suggested, economic development is intimately linked with
technological advancement, and while the Industrial Revolution in
England was based upon invention, and the Second Industrial
Revolution in the United States and Germany was based upon
innovation, in the twentieth century development has been largely
based upon learning and exploiting technology developed by others.168
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are all examples of this learning-based
development, and as such, have all faced the dilemma of needing
foreign technology while at the same time fearing foreign domination
of their industrial structures. In order to attract foreign capital and
technology while maintaining domestic control over their industries
and trade flows, each of these nations set up systems which restricted
foreign direct investment, and tended to channel most projects that
'67 The view is contested on two fronts. For free traders the decision of what gets
produced where, let alone who owns the production facilities, should be left to market
forces. From a somewhat different perspective, Robert Reich, who is often described
as an advocate of managed trade, argues that the concept of corporate nationality is
now largely outmoded. ROB0ERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991).
" AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 4.
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were allowed into minority shares in joint ventures with local
companies. 169 For foreign companies that did not find the joint
venture form attractive, the only alternative for entering these markets
was to license their technologies to local manufacturers, with no
equity participation.
Although foreign direct investment continues to be liberalized
in each of these nations, recognizing the depth of this nation-centered
view of industry may be important for understanding antidumping
enforcement in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. To the extent this
view still prevails in these countries, one would expect there to be a
strong inclination to protect local industry faced with foreign
competition, particularly where infant industry arguments apply.
V. ANTIDUMPING REGIMES OF JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAiWAN
IN PRACTICE
Having attempted a hypothesis about conceptions of the state
in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and having outlined potential
economic and trade policy implications of such a role for the state, it
is necessary to turn to empirical data. The following section briefly
describes the sources of antidumping law in Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan, then presents data on the use of such laws to date. The focus
here is not on legal aspects of the decisions, but on what, if anything,
these actions tell us about these nations' industrial policies.
,69 Taiwan has been the most receptive to wholly-owned foreign direct investments,
but maintains screening structure and policies. See WADE., supra note 30, at 148-56.
On Japan, see Yoko Sazanami, Japanese Industrial Policy, in INDusTIUAL POLICY IN
THEPACIF, supra note 30, at 115, 121;JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 217, 278-79. On
Korea, see AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 74-76; Woo, supra note 36, at 131 (speaking
particularly of the 1970s).
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A. Japan
Japan's antidumping legislation is found in Article 9 of the
Customs and Tariff Law, 7 ' an accompanying Cabinet Decree on
antidumping duties, and in the interministerial Guidelines on the
Procedure of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and Related
Matters."' Japan amended its antidumping rules in 1980, after
becoming a signatory to the Antidumping Code, so definitions of
"dumping," "normal value," "material injury," "domestic industry," etc.
generally track those in the Antidumping Code."' The following is a
brief outline of Japan's antidumping regime, followed by a review of
the cases handled to date. It should be noted that Japan will likely
amend at least some aspects of its antidumping system to conform to
changes brought about by GATT 94.173
1. Administrative Organs and Procedures.
Japan's Ministry of Finance ("MOF") has primary authority
over revenue matters such as taxes and tariffs, and it is given primary
authority over antidumping enforcement. 74 The MOF does not act
alone, however, but administers the law in concert with MITI and the
170 Horei Zensho (Complete Laws and Ordinances), Law No. 228, of 1949.
'7' The Guidelines were issued December 24, 1986, by the Ministries of Finance,
Health & Welfare, Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries, International Trade & Industry,
and Transport [hereinafter "Guidelines"]. They were not enacted as legislation, and
are described as not having the force of law, but controlling antidumping enforcement
nonetheless. Shintaro Hagiwara et al., Anti-Dumping Lmvs in Japan, 22 J. OF WORLD
TRADE L. 35,35 (1988).
171 For a summary, see MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 207-14 (1993). The Guidelines, though not legally
binding, state that Japan's antidumping system shall be operated in accordance with
the Antidumping Code. Guidelines, supra note 171, at item 12.
"7 Shintaro Hagiwara, The New Anti-dumping Code: What it Means for Japan (Paper
presented to the International Bar Association 25th Biennial Conference, Oct. 9-14,
1994).
' MATsutSHITA, supra note 172, at 9, 209.
1996-97] STATES, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES & ANTIDUMPING 341
Ministry with jurisdiction over the industry in question (the "relevant
Ministry"). 17 An interested party files a petition with the Customs
and Tariff Section of the MOF, which is then referred to an ad hoc
committee made up of officials from the MOF, ITI, and from the
relevant Ministry (hereinafter the "Investigation Committee"). 17 The
Investigation Committee will conduct the preliminary review of the
petition to see whether a formal investigation is warranted, and if
appropriate, will also carry out the investigation and recommend
antidumping duties." Antidumping duties are finally imposed by way
of Cabinet Order.
17 8
2. Practice to Date.
The following are summaries of cases which have progressed
to the point of petitions being filed with the MOF, though in most
instances formal investigations were never initiated. 79
a. Cotton yarn from South Korea.
On December 27, 1982 the Japan Spinners' Association
petitioned the MOF for antidumping relief against cotton thread
.75 Id. at 209.
76 Id. It has been reported that in the early 1980's MITI intended to create an affiliated
body similar to the USITC, except that unlike the USITC, the MITI body would have
handled both dumping investigations and injury determinations. MITI Plans Forming
Organ Similar to America's ITC, JAPAN EcoN. J., July 27, 1982, available in LEXIS.
This apparent power play by MITI was unsuccessful, but in 1993 it was again reported
that "[t]he amendment of the law to enable a decision through a single Administrative
Agency is expected." Hagiwara, supra note 17.
'"MASuSHITA, supra note 172, at 209-10.7" Hagiwara et al., supra note 171, at 40.
179 These case summaries, as well as those on antidumping enforcement in South
Korea and Taiwan, rely upon GATT reports, academic and professional publications,
and press reports. Due to practical linitations, no attempt has been made to obtain and
translate official materials from the antidunping authorities in these countries.
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imports from Korea. 8 This was the first petition filed under Japan's
modem antidumping statute, and it was withdrawn in July 1983, after
Korea put in place voluntary export restraints.
18 1
A recent article on Japan's textile industry began with the
following description: "Textiles have been a sunset industry in Japan
for years. In some sectors, the years of decline stretch close to a
century.,181 Japan's earliest export successes were in the textile
sector,183 and even when low-wage Taiwan and South Korea tried to
compete with Japanese textiles in the 1960s they had great
difficulty.' Japan is a signatory to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, but
is unusual in that it has never taken action under that agreement to
180 1 GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN at 62, GATT Sales. No. 1990-12
(1990)[hereinafter I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN (1990)]. See also
H-agiwara et al., supra note 171, at 46; MATSUSHITA, supra note 172, at 215. At the
same time the Spinners Association filed a petition seeking countervailing duty relief
against cotton yam imports from Pakistan. An official investigation was launched in
April 1983, but was terminated in February 1984. I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW:
JAPAN (1990), supra, at 62-63. The Japanese government reported to the GATT that
the case was closed "as the Pakistani Government decided to abolish part of the
subsidies," while the GATT Secretariat reported that Pakistan agreed to maintain
minimum export prices for cotton yam between 1985 and 1987. Id. at 63, 241.
.81 Hagiwara et al., supra note 171, at 47; MATSUSHITA, supra note 172, at 216.
1 Henny Sender, Hanging By a Thread: The Grim Reaper Calls on Japan's Textile
Industry, FAR EAST ECON. REV., Nov. 3, 1994, at 61.
" Prompting the first documented use of voluntary export restraints, see supra note
3 and accompanying text.
84 Alice H. Amsden, "Post-Industrial" Policy in East Asia, Asia Project Working
Paper, Council on Foreign Relations, February, 1995, at 5. Hikino and Amsden
attribute 1930s Japan's superior competitiveness in textiles to "its more modem and
integrated production facilities ..., its cartelized bulk-purchase of raw cotton, its better
distribution channels, and superior management ...." Takashi Hikino & Alice H.
Amsden, Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late
Industrialization in Historical Perspective, in CONVERGENCE OF PRODUCTIVITY:
CROSs-NATIONAL STUDIES AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 285, 293 n.6 (William J.
Baumol et al. eds., 1994) (citing B.E. HUBBARD, EASTERN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ITS
EFFECTS ON THE WEST (1938)).
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limit textile imports.' But by the 1980s, Japan's textile industry was
ready to ask for protection, and this action against Korean cotton yarn
was the first in what may be a long series of cases.
b. Ferrosilicon from Norway and France.
In the early 1980s, Japan's ferro-alloy industry was
experiencing serious difficulties, and was undergoing MITI
orchestrated reorganization under the Law to Promote Improvement
of Industrial Structure in Specific Industries."8 6 Finally, on March 6,
1984, the Japan Ferro-Alloy Association petitioned the MOF for
antidumping relief against imports of ferro-silicon from Norway and
France. 187
The Association claimed dumping margins of 1% to 27% for
exports from Norway and France during the years 1981 to 1983, and
claimed that the dumping was leading to increased imports, reduced
prices for domestic products, lower domestic production, and
therefore lost profits.' Both MITI and the MOF held hearings on the
matter, after which the French and Norwegian Embassies indicated
that exporters in their countries i) recognized that Japanese producers
were injured by increased import penetration, ii) agreed not to export
to Japan "under terms and conditions which may infringe GATT
rules," and iii) expected that the Japanese government would take
adequate measures against dumping by third country ferrosilicon
exporters."8 9 Following these representations, the Japan Ferro-Alloy
' I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN ( 990), supra note 180, at 241. See also
Sender, supra note 182, at 61.
" Hagiwara et al., supra note 171, at 47-48; MATSUSHITA, supra note 172, at 216.
1811 GATT TRADE POLICY REvIEw: JAPAN (1990), supra note 180, at 63. See also
Hagiwara et al., supra note 171, at 47-48; MATSUSHrrA, supra note 172, at 216. On
the same date a petition for countervailing duty relief was filed against ferro-silicon
imports from Brazil. This petition was also withdrawn on June 14, without a formal
investigation being initiated. I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN (1990), supra
note 180, at 63; Hagiwara et al., supra note 171, at 48.
'"Hagiwara et al., supra note 17 1, at 48.
'Id. at 49.
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Association withdrew its petition, and the MOF was able to terminate
its "pre-investigation" without initiating a formal investigation."
What is interesting about the French and Norwegian embassy
statements is that dumping by itself does not "infringe GATT rules. ''
9
Even if it causes or threatens material injury, dumping is only "to be
condemned" under Article VI, which is understood as being different
from an infringement of a GATT obligation.' 92 The promises
extracted from the French and the Norwegian governments thus seem
somewhat empty, even assuming that they have the power and the
inclination to monitor prices at which their nationals export. 93 What
the Norwegian and French exporters seem to have gotten for their
trouble is a promise by Japan to organize a market in which they could
safely raise their prices to levels acceptable to the Japanese petitioners,
without fear of being undercut by a third country's exports. They
were probably quite willing to do so, with the increased cost of ferro-
silicon being absorbed by Japanese steelmakers or passed along to
purchasers of Japanese steel. MITI presumably felt that these higher
prices would smooth its reorganization of the domestic industry.
c. Knitwear from South Korea.
Imports of South Korean textiles continued to grow during the
1980s, and in July 1988 the South Korean government reportedly
began to urge South Korean producers to "voluntarily" restrict
knitwear exports to Japan.' Imports did not slow sufficiently,
however, so on October 21, 1988 the Japanese Knitwear Industry
"Id.; see also MATSUSHITA, supra note 172, at 216.
'1' JACKSON, supra note 1, at 227 & n.38.
19 Id.
" For a discussion of the common misperception that dumping is "illegal" and can
be policed by exporting countries, see id. at 227 & n.39.
194 Japanese Knitwear Makers File Suit Against S. Korea, Japan Economic
Newswire, Oct. 21, 1988, available in LEXIS; Antidumping Duties Sought on ROK
Knit hnports, Jiji Press Ticker Service, Oct. 20, 1988, available in LEXIS.
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Association petitioned the MOF for antidumping relief' Meanwhile,
MITI continued to press Seoul for voluntary restrictions, and in
February 1989 the Korean Garment and Knitwear Association
announced the implementation of a 'check-price' system for exports to
Japan of sweaters, cardigans and vests until 1991, as well as promising
to limit export growth to 1% per year.196 The petition was then
withdrawn in March 1989, without an investigation being initiated. 97
The facts surrounding the "voluntary" measures by South
Korean producers to limit their exports to Japan are in dispute. A
Japanese news report from the day the relief petition was filed quotes
Eiichi Tamori, Deputy Director General of MITI's Consumer Goods
Industry Bureau, to the effect that Japan would "continue to urge
Seoul to press for 'orderly knitwear exports."' 98 The Asahi newspaper
also doubted the voluntariness of the agreement, comparing it to the
"voluntary" restraints the United States has convinced Japan to
impose on Japan's own exports.' 99 Yet in 1990, when the issue of
Korean export restraints was raised with Japan's representative to the
GATT Trade Policy Review body, "he reiterated that as far as the
Government was concerned, it had never requested other contracting
parties to take voluntary export restraint measures, and it had no
intention to do so in the future."2" While it seems unlikely that
Japan's representative to the GATT body would be intentionally
dishonest about such a matter, it seems equally unlikely that Korean
sweater exporters would volunteer to forego exports to Japan. In
fact, in Japan's 1992 Trade Policy Review, the Korean representative
charged that Korean sweaters and Korean-caught tuna "were subject
"I I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN (1990), supra note 180, at 63. See also
MATSUSHITA, supra note 172, at 216; Japanese Knitwear Makers File Suit Against
S. Korea, supra note 194.
'9 I GATT TRADE POLICY REvIEw: JAPAN (1990), supra note 180, at 242.
I9 d.at 63.
Japanese Knitwear Makers File Suit Against S. Korea, supra note 194; see also
Antidumping Duties Sought on ROK Knit Imports, supra note 194.
'" Sam Jameson, Protectionist Policy Emerges in S. Korean Deal: Japan's Textiles
Limit Contradicts Claim on Imports, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 8, 1989, at 2.
200 I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN (1990), supra note 180, at 355.
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to VERs at Japan's request.
20 1
d. Ferrosilico-Manganese from Norway, South Africa, and the
People's Republic of China.
On October 8, 1991, the Japan Ferro-Alloy Association filed
a petition for antidumping relief against imports of ferrosilico-
manganese from the People's Republic of China, Norway, and South
Africa.20' Association figures showed dumping margins of 75% for
China, 54.8% for Norway, and 67.4% for South Africa.20 3 In late
November 1991, a formal investigation was begun, the first ever in
Japan's antidumping practice, and in December 1991 an Investigation
Committee was convened with representatives from MITI and the
MOF.
2 °4
In June 1992, the Investigation Committee released
preliminary investigation results, showing dumping margins of 4.5%
to 27.2% for the seven Chinese exporters investigated, 10.5% for the
single Norwegian exporter, and 0.8% and 1.8% for the two South
African exporters. 2°' No provisional duties were imposed, however,
because imports of ferrosilico-manganese from the three nations had
dropped sharply since the start of the investigation.2' This drop
reportedly was the result of voluntary reductions in imports by
Japanese trading companies.
2 7
The Committee also decided at this time or shortly thereafter
that imports from Norway and South Africa were not injuring Japan's
domestic industry, so the investigation was terminated with regard to
201 II GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN 147 (1992).
'Id. at 64-65. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Hagiwara, supra note 17. ,See
also, Japan Will Investigate Allegations of Dunping, AsIAN WALL ST. J. 3, Dec. 2,
1991, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 3.
203 Japan Will Investigate Allegations of Dumping, supra note 202.
204 11 GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN (1992), supra note 20 1, at 64.
205 Hagiwara, supra note 17, at 378.
20 II GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN (1992), supra note 201, at 64-65.
Leslie Helm, Japan Deftly Fents Off'Duniped' Wares, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1993,
at H3.
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imports from these two nations.2"' The investigation went forward
with regard to Chinese imports, however, and eventually involved
approximately 100 separate Chinese exporters.2"
On January 29, 1993 Japan announced that it would impose
final antidumping duties of 4.5% to 27.2% on more than 100 Chinese
exporters, effective February 3, 1993.210 Because of the large number
of Chinese exporters involved, and because some of them apparently
did not cooperate in the investigation, Japan imposed a duty of 27.2%
on ferrosilico manganese imports from China generally, with lower
duties of 4.5% to 19.1% for those individual exporters who
cooperated with the investigation. 11
e. Cotton yarn from Pakistan.
In December 1993 the Japan Spinners Association petitioned
for antidumping relief against cotton yam imports from Pakistan.
No further information was found on the status of this case.
IHagiwara, supra note 17, at 378. The legal basis for this termination is somewhat
unclear. Hagiwara indicates that it was because few sales by exporters from these two
nations were considered diversions of sales that would have gone to Japanese
suppliers, id. at 384, while another source reports MITI as saying that the termination
came because Norway's exports were too small, and South Africa's dumping margins
too narrow. Jacob M. Schlesinger and Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japan Imposes
Dumping Duty on China, AsLAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
WSJ-ASIA 3. The discrepancy is important because it suggests a potential lack of
transparency in Japan's antidumping administration.
209 Hagiwara, supra note 17, at 378. Two of the original seven Chinese exporters
offered price undertakings and were dropped from the investigation. Id.
210 Schlesinger and Kanabayashi, supra note 208.
211 1agiwara, supra note 17, at 380-81. Country-wide antidumping duties are allowed
under Article 9. 1 of the Anti-Dumping Code.
212 Japanese Spinners Accuse Taiwan of Dumping, ASIAN ECON. NEws, Feb. 14,
1994, available in WESTLAW, AECON.
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f. Rayon fibers from Taiwan and Indonesia.
In May 1993 the Japan Spinners' Association and the Japan
Chemical Fibers Association sent investigators to Taiwan to collect
evidence concerning local market and export prices there. In early
February 1994, the chairman of the Japan Spinners Association said
that his group and the Chemical Fibers Association were considering
filing ajoint petition for antidumping relief against spun rayon fibers
from Taiwan," 4 then in late February the two groups reported that
they planned to file an antidumping petition in the summer of 1994.15
It was later reported that a second mission had been sent to Taiwan
in February 1994, and that as a result of that mission Taiwan's export
prices to Japan had been raised and the dumping issue quelled.216
Finally, in June 1994 it was reported that the Chemical Fibers
Association would send an investigation team to Indonesia to collect
local market and export pricing data,2" 7 suggesting that the problem
had not been resolved.
3. Conclusions from Japan's Antidumping Practice to Date,
The central theme that emerges from examining Japan's
antidumping practice is the ability of MITI and the MOF to maintain
their discretion in trade matters by arranging settlements of most
dumping disputes without even formal investigations being started.2 8
This ability appears to be under strain, however, especially in textiles.
Japan's trade bureaucrats take pride in the fact that they have
213 Fiber Groups Prepare Dumping Charges Against Taiwan, Comline News
Service, Feb. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
214 Japanese Spinners Accuse Taiwan of Dunping, supra note 212.
215 Fiber Groups Prepare Dumping Charges Against Taiwan, supra note 213.
216 Team to Examine Indonesia Rayon Dumping, Comline News Service, June 1,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
217 Id.
2"' This preference for informal administration, not subject to judicial review, is
discussed further below. ,See notes 454-68 and accompanying text.
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never invoked the Multifibre Arrangement to limit imports,"' yet to
preserve that record they appear to pressure less developed countries
into restraining exports. In addition to the antidumping and
countervailing duty measures described above, Japan's raw silk
imports are subject to state trading, raw silk and silk cocoon prices are
subject to a government price stabilization scheme, China maintains
orderly export arrangements on its raw silk, silk yarn, and silk product
exports, and South Korea maintains orderly export arrangements on
its silk yam and silk fabrics." Japan's textile industry is still in trouble
however, and MITI is reportedly considering a freeze of up to five
years on cotton thread and cotton weave imports.
2 2'
MITI is caught in a dilemma familiar to United States
policymakers, as the textile industry itself is divided between larger
companies, who have moved production off-shore and thus oppose
import restrictions, and smaller companies who still provide many jobs
at home.' z This appears to represent a breakdown of the old textile
protection system, under which MITI could reportedly make
antidumping or safeguard actions unnecessary by simply contacting
importers and asking that they "please be more orderly" in their
imports.' 3
With regard to the ferro-silicon and ferro-silicon manganese
cases, while the exact relationship between the two substances is
unclear, both are used in steelmaking, and both industries are
represented by the Ferro-Alloy Association. If MITI's reorganization
plans of the early 1980s were carried out, yet antidumping relief was
still necessary less than ten years later, it is perhaps correct to expect
continuing requests for protection by this industry in the future.
2,9 Jameson, supra note 199.
220 I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: JAPAN ( 990), supra note 180, at 241.
' Sender, supra note 182, at 61.2n Id.
' Helm, supra note 207, quoting Tomoyuki Takeuchi of the Japan Textiles Importers
Association. Helm reports Takeuchi as saying that "[i]f there is a sudden increase in
imports of any product, ... the most likely way of resolving the problem is not to file
a dumping case, but for the domestic industry to contact MITI." Id.
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B. South Korea
South Korea's antidumping law is found in Article 10 of the
Customs Act,2"4 its accompanying Enforcement Decree,225 and
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance ("MOF"). 2 6 The basic
statutory design of South Korea's antidumping law thus parallels that
of Japan's, though administrative structures and enthusiasm for
enforcement differ significantly between the two systems.
The first South Korean antidumping law was enacted in
1963, '  when South Korea was not yet a member of the GATT, and
was just beginning its export push under Park Chung Hee's new
government. These 1963 provisions were never used, and in fact no
implementing legislation was ever enacted."' South Korea became a
signatory to the GATT in 1967, and in 1969 Article 10 was amended
to conform with GATT Article VI.2-9 Then in 1983, although the law
had still never been used, Article 10 was amended once again." 0 In
discussing this era, one commentator states that "[a]lthough petitions
filed by domestic industries against foreign manufacturers were
routinely investigated, the Korean government was by and large
224 Customs Act, Law No. 1976 (1967), amended by Law No. 4674
(1993)[hereinafler "Act"].
225 The Enforcement Decrees governing implementation of the Act and many other
statutes are Presidential Decrees, which are amended by later Presidential Decrees.
The Enforcement Decree for the Act is Presidential Decree No. 4449 (1969),
amended by Presidential Decree 14044 (1 993)[hereinafter Decree].
226 In the same manner as the Japanese Interministerial Guidelines, the guidelines
issued by the MOF [hereinafler Guidelines] govern antidumping enforcement without
having the force of law. For an overview of the South Korean trade regime, including
the antidumping system, see David A. Laverty, Regulation and Liberalization of
Imports and Foreign Investment and the Role of Trade Actions in the Republic of
Korea, 11 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 423, 439-51 (1990).
227 Chan Jin Kim, supra note 25, at 2.
228 Id.
229 Id.
' Hyung Jin Kim, The CUr'ent Korean Anti-Dumping System, 21 KoREAN JOURNAL
or COMPARATIVE LAW i,2 (1993).
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reluctant to regulate foreign companies until 1985. '"" It is unclear
whether the petitions and investigations referred to were formal or
informal, but none of the complaints proceeded to the point of formal
action against imports.
South Korea became a signatory to the Antidumping Code in
February 1986, and immediately thereafter amended the Decree and
Guidelines. As the passage quoted above indicates, the South Korean
government felt that dumping was becoming a serious problem even
before the 1986 amendments, but found the existing law inadequate
to cope with the problem."32 The first formal antidumping
investigation was initiated in April 1986, the same month as the
Enforcement Decree was amended, thus effectively marking the
beginning of South Korean antidumping practice. In a related
development, the Foreign Trade Act was amended to create the
Korean Trade Commission ("KTC") as of July 1, 1987."3
The Decree was amended again in December 1988, and in
February.1989 the MOF enacted new Guidelines."3 The Act and the
Decree received GATT approval in October 1989, and were then
amended again in December 1990.35 The current Decree and
Regulations came into force January 1, 1993. Like Japan, South
Korea will likely amend its antidumping system in light of GATT
94.236
1. Administrative Organs and Procedure.
The MOF has jurisdiction over revenue matters, including
tariff administration, so as in Japan the MOF has ultimate authority
23 Id. at 2-3.
I 3'd. at 3.
213 d. at 22.
234 Id.
235 Id.
2 Dong Woo Seo, The New Anti-Dumping Code: What it Means for Korea? (Paper
presented to the International Bar Association 25th Biennial Conference, 9-14 Oct.
1994).
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over antidumping duties. However, while Japan establishes ad hoc
panels to handle each case, South Korea established the KTC to have
jurisdiction over certain aspects of all antidumping matters. The MOF
exercises its authority through its Customs Deliberation Committee
("CDC"), which can ultimately recommend that antidumping duties be
imposed. 7 The basic division of labor is that the CDC instructs its
subordinate, the Office of Customs Administration ("OCA"), to
investigate dumping, while the KTC investigates injury to the
domestic industry." If the OCA finds dumping and the KTC finds
material injury, the CDC recommends to the Minister of Finance that
antidumping duties be imposed." 9 If the Minister of Finance agrees,
duties will be imposed by Presidential Decree. The KTC is under the
authority of the Ministry of Trade, Energy and Industry ("MOTIE,"
formerly the Ministry of Trade and Industry, or "MTI"), which creates
at least a formal separation between the treasury functions of the
MOF, and the trade and industrial policy competence of the MOTIE.
2. Practice to Date.
The following are antidumping matters which have arisen to
date. As was the case with Japanese practice described above, these
summaries focus on economic effects, rather than on legal procedures.
a. Dicumyl Peroxide ("DCP") from Japan and Taiwan.
This was the first investigation initiated after the 1986
amendments, and was South Korea's first major antidumping action.
The petition was filed in April 1986, by a single South Korean
237 Kim, supra note 230, at 36-37. The CDC is chaired by the Vice-Minister of
Finance, and consists of senior members of the other economic and relevant ministries,
the National Tax Administration, the Customs Administration, and "an expert"
appointed by the MOF. I GATT TRADE POLICY REvIEW: KOREA 109 n.55 (1992).
'3 Id. at 25.
" There seems to be disagreement over whether KTC and OCA determinations are
binding on the CDC. See Kim, supra note 230, at 25.
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producer against two Japanese and two Taiwanese exporters. 24 The
petitioner alleged dumping margins of 49.6% on DCP from Japan, and
55% on Taiwanese DCP.24' One of the Japanese companies indicated
that it would stop exporting to South Korea altogether, while the
other three companies offered price undertakings effective January 1,
1987.242 The MOF accepted the offers of the four companies, and
halted its investigation in December 1986.
b. Acetaldehyde from Japan.
At the same time as the DCP complaint, a complaint was filed
by a single South Korean producer of acetaldehyde against a single
Japanese exporter.4 3 The petitioner alleged that the Japanese
exporter was selling acetaldehyde in South Korea at $449 per ton less
than the price in Japan.244 An investigation found a dumping margin
of 54.4%, but was terminated in December 1986 because material
injury was not found.24 5
c. Slide fasteners (zippers) from Japan.
This petition was filed in October 1986 by multiple petitioners,
including the trade association and over 70 individual zipper
producers, against a single Japanese exporter.2 6 Petitioners alleged
240 Id. at 39-40. See also, South Korea Invoking Antidumping Claims, Jiji Press
Newswire, May 21, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
241 South Korea Invoking Antidumping Claims, supra note 240.
242 Kim, supra note 230, at 39.
23 Id. at 38. See also, South Korea Invoking Anti-Dumping Claims, supra note 240.
It appears that at the same time a complaint was filed against alginic acid from Hong
Kong, but no further information was found. Dong Woo Seo, supra note 236, at 5
n.16.
244 South Korea Invoking Anti-Dumping Claims, supra note 240.
245 Kim, supra note 230, at 38.
246 An Overall Review of Korean Anti-Dumping Laws and Procedure, III ASIA
PAEr LAWMONTmY 3 (Min, Sohn & Kim, Seoul, Korea), May & June, 1990. An
earlier report had the petition being filed in July, 1986, but this seems to have been
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that the Japanese products were being sold at 40% to 60% less than
Japanese prices to offset a blow to their price competitiveness caused
by an appreciation in the value of the Japanese Yen vis-a-vis the South
Korean Won.247 In January 1987 an official investigation was begun,
which was finally terminated in February 1988. The investigation
found that 111 of 165 categories of slide fastener products were being
dumped, at an average dumping margin of 19.76%, but found no
material injury to the South Korean industry.248 The MTI (now
MOTIE) reportedly was against imposing antidumping duties on the
zippers because they were used as inputs in South Korean export
goods, which would thus become more expensive, and to avoid trade
friction with Japan. 49
d. Dicumyl Peroxide ("DCP')from Japan and Taiwan ("DCP
II').
This second DCP case began in July 1988, after the petitioner
requested a review of the undertakings given in DCP I, and the
Japanese respondent requested an increase in the undertaking price.25
During re-examination, the two Taiwanese respondents were found to
have violated their undertakings by giving refunds to their South
Korean customers to reduce the effective import price, so in October
1988 the MOF required that they deposit security of 46% to 52% of
premature. YKKto Face AntidumipingSuit in ROK, Jiji Press Ticker Service, July 25,
1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
247 YKK to Face Antidumping Suit in ROK, supra note 246.
248 ROK Withholds Dumping Duty on Y.K.K. Fasteners, Jiji Press Ticker Service,
Feb. 19, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
249 South Korean Minisity Opposes Dumping Duty on Zippers, Kyodo News Service,
Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 18, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File. This is a recurring dilemma in South Korean and Taiwanese trade
relations with Japan, as Japan still supplies machine tools, auto parts, electronic
components, and manufacturing technology necessary for the export industries of
South Korea and Taiwan.
250 Kim, supra note 230, at 39.
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the export price of DCP imported from them, plus an additional tax.251
The provisional measure remained in effect during the re-investigation,
which lasted until January 1989.252 At that time the MOF issued a
final ruling that the original undertakings would end December 31,
1989, and that if at that time it appeared necessary, the investigation
would be re-opened and antidumping duties of 24.5%, 12.5% and
13.6% would be assessed against the three respondents. 53
e. Alumina cement from France.
The petition was filed in September 2, 1988 by a single South
Korean cement producer against a single French exporter.254 A
preliminary investigation found probability of dumping in the range of
61.5% to 96.6%, and injury to the domestic industry, so a formal
investigation was initiated in January 1989.255 The investigation was
terminated, however, after the respondent agreed to a price
undertaking covering exports between September 1, 1989 and
September 1, 1991, by which it guaranteed a minimum export price of
$338.70 per ton.256
The South Korean petitioner reportedly began producing
alumina cement in September 1987, which, if correct, means that the
petition was filed after approximately one year of production.2 57 The
petitioner indicated that the price difference between its cement and
the cement produced by the respondent was between $227 and $302
25! Id.; Penalties Assessed Against Taiwan Firms for Dumping Bonding Agent,
KOREA ECONOMIC DAiLY, Oct. 19, 1988, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"2 Kin, supra note 230, at 39.
113 Id. at 39-40.
254 An Overall Review of Korean Anti-Dumping Laws and Procedure, supra note
246, at 3. See also, Cement Antidumping Complaint Filed, Chemicals Business
News Base, Dec. 1, 1988, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"5 Laverty, supra note 226, at 451; An Overall Review of Korean Anti-Dumping
Laws and Procedure, supra note 246, at 3.
"' An Overall Review of Korean Anti-Dumping Laws and Procedure, supra note
246, at 3.
" Cement Antidumping Complaint Filed, supra note 254.
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per ton, and that it had been forced to cut its operations by 74% in the
third quarter of the 1987-88 fiscal year.2"8 Although details of the
case were not obtained for this paper, it appears to have been a case
of using antidumping law to assist the establishment of an "infant"
industry.
f. Polyacrylamide ("PAA") from England, France and
Germany.
The petition was filed October 6, 1989 by a single South
Korean producer against one English, one French, and one German
exporter."9 The petitioner alleged that they and two other South
Korean PAA producers had been forced to reduce their operating
rates by 29% to 33% as a result of imports which were being sold at
28% to 54% below home market prices.260 On February 17, 1990,
after a preliminary investigation, the MOF initiated a formal
investigation.26'
In order to make its injury determination the KTC had to i)
define the domestic industry, ii) determine whether the industry as
defined had suffered material injury, and iii) determine whether such
injury had been caused by the allegedly dumped imports.262 To define
the domestic industry the KTC had to decide to what extent three
different forms ofPAA should be treated as distinct products. 263 The
KTC found that two of the forms constituted a single product, while
the third form constituted a separate and distinct product. The KTC
then eliminated certain domestic producers from the two "industries"
258 Id.
259 Kim, supra note 230, at 40.
Foreign Firms InvestigatedforDumnping PAA, KOREA ECONOMIc DAILY, February
23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
261 Kim, supra note 230, at 40. See also, Foreign Fins hwestigated for Dumping
PAA, supra note 260.
262 The following description of the PAA case relies upon
Kim, supra note 230, at 40-44.
263 The three different forms are anion, nonanion, and cation. Id. at 41.
1996-97] STATES, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES & ANTIDUMPING 357
because they had imported the relevant forms of polyacrylamide
within the previous six months. With two domestic "industries" thus
defined, the KTC examined the health of the industries to determine
whether material injury had occurred.
In investigating material injury the KTC considered the
following factors: domestic production capacity, operating rates,
volume of domestic shipments, market share fluctuations, total sales,
total operating profits, pre-tax profits, fluctuations in the sales price
of domestic goods, and absolute and relative increases in import
volumes.2 For the industry producing two of the polyacrylamide
forms, the KTC found that declining net profits were caused by
unrelated factors such as increased wages and costs.265 Total imports
were increasing no more than the rise in domestic demand, suggesting
that the single South Korean producer in the "industry" was
maintaining its market share (ie., marginal imports were not
increasing), and it seemed that imports from the respondents were in
part simply replacing imports from Japan."
The second polyacrylamide "industry" consisted of two South
Korean producers. One producer was experiencing downturns in
several areas, but the KTC found that these were primarily attributable
to labor disputes rather than dumped imports.267 The other domestic
producer in the "industry" was showing downturns in some
production figures, but its profits were rising. The KTC concluded
that this producer had not suffered material injury, and therefore did
not need to consider causation. 6 The KTC also found that no threat
of material injury existed that would have warranted the imposition of
antidumping duties.269
This case was important for the development of South Korean
antidumping law, despite the fact that no injury was found and no
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duties imposed. Because the case progressed to a formal KTC
decision being rendered, the KTC was required to issue formal rulings
with regard to central issues such as definitions of the domestic
industry, and material injury. This case thus marked a step away from
informality and discretion in favor of transparency and ultimately,
accountability.
g. Polyacetal Resin from the United States and Japan.
The case that has drawn the most outside attention to South
Korean antidumping practices involved imports of polyacetal resin
from two producers in the United States and one in Japan. The
petition was filed May 8, 1990 by a single South Korean producer
against one Japanese and two United States producers.Y7 Following
a three month preliminary investigation, a formal investigation was
begun on August 25, 1990.271 On February 20, 1991 the OCA
announced dumping margins of 20.6% to 107.6%, and on April 24,
1991 the KTC announced its determination that the domestic industry
had suffered material injury.2 72 On July 19, 1991 it was reported that
the MOF was threatening antidumping duties of 85.2% to 92.2%,273
but the final MOF recommendation was for a minimum import price
equivalent to an additional 4% duty on top of the standard 13% duty
on polyacetal resin imports.7 4 In late August 1991 the Cabinet
approved the MOF recommendation,2 and duties were imposed as
27 Id. at 44. See also, South Korea: Govetment Ivestigates AcetalAntidumiping
Charges FiledAgainst Du Pont and Hoechst, Chemicals Business News Base, July
18, 1990, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
7I Kim, supra note 230, at 44.
272 Id.
' S. Korea to Impose Stif Duinping Duties on Plastic Resin, Kyodo News Service,
Japan Economic Newswire, July 19, 1991, available in LEXIS.
274 Damon Darlin, Seoul Places Price Penalty on Foreign Plastics Firms, AsIAN
WALL ST. J., July 24, 199 1, at 3, available ii WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 3.
"S ROK to Levy Dumping Duty on Resin Imports, Jiji Press Ticker Service, August
29, 1991, available in LEXIS.
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of September 14, 199 L'7 This case marked the first affirmative injury
determination by the KTC, and the first instance of antidumping duties
being imposed. Considering the controversial nature of the KTC's
injury finding, which became the basis of a GATT complaint by the
United States, and because the facts of the case present a pattern that
may be repeated, it will be useful to examine the injury finding in some
detail.
The domestic "industry" consisted of the single South Korean
producer of polyacetal resin, Korea Engineering Plastics Co., Ltd.
("KEP"). KEP started resin production during the last quarter of
1988, so when it filed its petition in May 1990, KEP had been in
production approximately 18 months.277  When KEP started
production the three respondents supplied over 60% of the market,
but during the period of the investigation (January 1, 1989 to March
31, 1990) KEP increased its market share from 1% to 57%.278 During
the investigation period the price of resin remained constant or
declined slightly, depending upon the grade, and KEP reported profits
during 1989 and the first quarter of 1990.279 Profits during the first
quarter of 1990 were down from 1989 levels, however, and the KTC's
material injury finding was reportedly based on the fact that KEP's
pre-tax profits of 1.6% were below the industry average of 3.24%.280
Recalling the factors on which the KTC based its injury findings in the
PAA case,2sI it is unclear why the KTC chose to give such weight to
a slight decline in profits, when other important factors such as
domestic production capacity, market share and sales price all seemed
to militate against a finding of material injury.
As might have been expected, the respondents were not
content with the KTC's finding. The concern was expressed that, even
though the duties imposed were small, the KTC precedent could be
276 Kim, supra note 230, at 44.
277 d. at 45.
27 Id. See also, Darlin, supra note 274.
29 Kim, supra note 230, at 45.
SId.
281 See supra notes 259-69 and accompanying text.
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used to block the importation of other goods whose producers
lowered prices to meet South Korean competition. 82 Given the lack
of effective judicial review of antidumping determination, 83 other than
diplomatic channels the only forum available to review the decision
was GATT, which required that the United States and/or Japanese
governments espouse the claims of their nationals. Although Japan
raised the case with South Korean representatives in Geneva,
ultimately it was the United States alone that pursued GATT dispute
resolution. After preliminary negotiations, mediation, etc. failed, a
GATT panel was convened at the request of the United States. The
panel found that the KTC's injury determination was inconsistent with
its GATT obligations, and South Korea did not move to block
adoption of the panel report 8 4 In April 1993 the MOF announced
that it would revoke the antidumping duty.
285
This case highlights one potential problem with antidumping
statutes being administered by industrial policy bureaucracies such as
exist in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In a country where financing
decisions were largely market driven, it seems unlikely that KEP
would have been able to raise the capital necessary to enter the resin
market. DuPont, Asahi and Hoechst, all world leaders in
petrochemicals, together controlled 60% of the market. South Korea
had no domestic production, and the only way the market would ever
have allocated capital to KEP would have been if there had been an
understanding that substantial government protection would have
been forthcoming. Financing was not cheap in South Korea in 1988,
and petrochemicals are not a labor intensive industry in which South
Korea would still retain some competitive advantage based on its
comparatively low wage structure. This case provides an excellent
example of a state rejecting static comparative advantage in favor of
2' Darlin, supra note 274.
See infira notes 469-80 and accompanying text.
See, Report of the Panel adopted by the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices on
Apr. 27, 1993. BISD-S-(GATT Doc. ADP/92, Apr. 2, 1993).
'Asian Pacific Brief- Du Pont Co., AsIAN WALL ST. J. 4, Apr. 28, 1993, available
in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 4.
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purposeful advancement into higher levels of technology and
technologically driven industrialization; unfortunately, this is not an
internationally accepted use of antidumping statutes.
The industrial policy reasoning seems to have been that South
Korea needed a domestic source of resin, which is an upstream
component of plastic auto body parts, among other things. This
would be essentially an "infant" industry argument, based ultimately
upon desires to localize technology and to preserve foreign exchange
by reducing imports. On the other hand, this case might be an
example of what could be termed "backward industrial policy,"
whereby KEP made the enormous investment to obtain the technology
and build the production capacity, then let the government know that
if protection were not forthcoming the project would fail. This would
presume, however, that KEP had obtained its financing originally
without government approval, which is unlikely in the South Korean
economy.
According to the respondents, KEP came into the market by
underpricing, 8 6 and the fact that prices didn't fall significantly during
the period of the investigation (January 1990 to March 1991) indicates
that KEP entered the market at a low price, rather than being forced
to lower its prices by dumped imports. That in turn suggests that
KEP sold at a loss to gain market share, but because it could not drive
its competition out of the market entirely, it had to leave its prices
low. Under this scenario, when it could not sustain the low prices any
longer, KEP asked the government for relief in the form of
antidumping duties. The respondents admitted from the outset that
their prices on the South Korean market were lower than their home
market prices, but alleged that they lowered prices to meet KEP's.
2s7
This phenomenon, sometimes known as "technical dumping," would
normally not be actionable because injury could hardly be attributed
to the imports, even if dumped, but under GATT Article VI,
antidumping duties are permitted where dumped goods are materially
Darlin, supra note 274.
UId.
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retarding the formation of a domestic industry.28 "Technical
dumping" would be an obvious means to retard the
establishment/development of an "infant" local competitor, because
the most obvious way for the new local industry to compete would be
on price. By "technical dumping" the established international
suppliers could take away any ability the local entrant might have to
compete on price, thus making market entry extremely difficult.
h. Ball bearings from Thailand.
On June 3, 1992 the sole South Korean producer of miniature
ball bearings for use in VTR head drums and printers petitioned for
antidumping relief against imports from NUB Thai Limited., a Thai
subsidiary of Minebea Corporation of Japan.289 The petitioner alleged
that the bearings were being sold in South Korea for 83% less than the
Thai market price.29 In August 1992 the MOF initiated a formal
investigation of the matter, which resulted in preliminary findings of
dumping and material injury. In late October 1992 the MOF imposed
a provisional antidumping duty of 12.5%, and continued the
investigation."' This marked the first time South Korea had imposed
provisional antidumping duties. On January 15, 1993 the MOF
announced a final dumping margin of 6.27%, and on January 28, 1993
the KTC announced its decision that the establishment of the domestic
industry was being materially retarded by the dumped imports.2 92 In
February 1993 it was reported that the government had accepted a
promise by the respondent to refrain from dumping, and would
GATT, supra note 7, at art. VI(i).
Kim, supra note 230, at 48-49; Dumping Suits in Korea Tatget Minebea, Others,
AsluN WALL ST. J. 3, July 8, 1992, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 3.
290 Dumping Suits in Korea Target Minebea, Others, supra note 289.
291 Kim, supra note 230, at 49; Seoul Imposes Duties in Dumping Cases, AsiAN
WALL ST. J. 4, Oct. 22, 1992, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 4.
292 Kim, supra note 230, at 49.
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therefore postpone imposing antidumping duties.29 3 However, on
April 1, 1993 a Presidential Decree was issued imposing a final
antidumping duty of 6.27%, applicable for five years from the date of
the provisional duties, October 27, 1992."9
In its injury determination the KTC found that the domestic
industry had not been established, and that its potential establishment
was being retarded by the dumped imports." The petitioner was in
fact operating two production lines, but these were losing money and
the petitioner's claim seems essentially to have been that it needed to
expand production in order to reach economies of scale necessary to
break even.29 Planned expansions had not been carried out because
the dumping kept prices unprofitably low, and the KTC found that this
constituted material retardation of the local industry.
297
i. Phosphoric acidfrom China.
This case was brought by the South Korean Chemical Industry
Association against Chinese phosphoric acid producers.29 The share
of the South Korean phosphoric acid market held by Chinese exports
had risen from 26% in 1989 to 45% in 1991, and South Korean
producers alleged that the lower Chinese prices were due to
dumping.2 In October 1992, provisional antidumping duties of
44.73% to 59.34% were imposed on exports by eleven Chinese and
Hong Kong exporters, and investigations were continued.3" In
February 1993 the investigation concluded, and the government
imposed final antidumping duties of 40.46% to 54.28% for a period
'South Korean Duties inposedfor 'Dumping,' AsIAN WALL ST. J. 4, Feb. 8, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 4.
14 Kim, supra note 230, at 49.
295 Id. at 49-50.
'2 Id. at 50-51.
2 Id. at 50.
Dumping Suits in Korea Target Minebea, Others, supra note 289.
Damon Darlin, South Korea Feels Effects of China Trade, AsIAN WALL ST. J. 1,
Nov. 17, 1992, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 1.
" Seoul Imposes Duties in Dumping Cases, supra note 291.
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of three years.3"' This marked South Korea's second imposition of
final antidumping duties.
j. Hydroxynaphthiene-disulfonic acid ("H-A cid) from Japan,
India and China.
In this case a single South Korean producer of H-acid sought
antidumping duties against imports from one Japanese, two Indian,
and one Chinese exporter.30 2  The petitioner claimed that the
respondents were selling H-acid on the South Korean market for 83%
less than on the Japanese market.0 3 On October 26, 1992 preliminary
antidumping duties of 17.6% were imposed on H-acid from Japan,
5.03% to 9.81% on H-acid from India, and 5.92% to 9.89% on H-
acid from China.3" Three days later the MOF reported that the South
Korean petitioner had withdrawn its petition.3 5
k. Disodium carbonate from China.
In March 1993 South Korea levied antidumping duties of
66.11% for a period of three years on imports of disodium carbonate
from several Chinese producers.30 6
1. Printing plates from Japan.
In July 1993, OCA announced preliminary antidumping duties
of 84% to 89% on printing plates produced by three Japanese
301 South Korean Duties hIposed for 'Dumping,' supra note 293.
3 2 Kim, supra note 289.
303 Id. The petitioner did not rely on home market prices for sales by the Indian or
Chinese respondents.
' Customs Office Imposes Anti-Dumping Fee on H-Acid, KOREA ECONOMIc DAILY,
Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
30 Asian-Pacific Brief. Pungkuk Oil Co., AsIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1992, at 19,
available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 19.
" Antidumping Duties Placed on Glass Fibers, PAC RIM INTELLIGENCE REPORT,
Aug. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS.
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companies.0 7 In 1994, final duties of 25.41% to 38.16% were
imposed for a three year period.0 8
m. Sodium hydroxide from the United States, China, France
and Belgium.
A petition was filed by the Korea Soda Production Association
in April 1993 against imports of sodium hydroxide.0 9 In August,
1994 the MOF was quoted as saying that it would finish its
investigation soon.310
n. Glass fiber products from the United States, Japan and
Taiwan.
This petition was filed in August 1993 by a single South
Korean glass producer against several producers from the United
States, Japan, and Taiwan.311 In February 1994 provisional
antidumping duties of between 9.1% and 82.4% were imposed on five
products from eight companies in Japan, Taiwan and the United
States, 312 and investigations continued. In August 1994, the MOF
imposed final antidumping duties of 10.3% to 58.7% on glass fiber
imports from the three targeted nations, which are to remain in place
o Japanese Charged with Dumping Printing Plates, KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY, July
20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
" Antidumping Duties Placed on Glass Fibers, supra note 306.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 S.Korea to Probe Glass Fibre Dumping Complaints, Reuter Financial Service,
Sept. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
312 Seoul Imposes Anti-Duniping Duty on Fibeiglass from Taiwan, CHINA ECONOMIC
NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline; Antidumping
Duties on Glass Fibre, CHEMIcALs BusINEss NEWS BASE, Apr. 3, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
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for a period of five years from April 12, 1994.313
o. Disintegrated calcined calcium phosphates from Russia.
A petition was filed against Russian phosphates in late 1993 or
early 1994, and preliminary antidumping duties of 80% were imposed
for a period of four months from March, 1994.314
p. Other miscellaneous antidumping actions.
In 1988 South Korean cigarette interests threatened to file
antidumping complaints against imports of cigarettes from the United
States, 315 and in 1989 a petition and then withdrawn against imports
of organic peroxides from Japan and the Netherlands. 316 In 1991
South Korean computer makers reportedly were preparing to request
antidumping relief against personal computers from Taiwan, 31 7 and in
1992 South Korean nylon producers were reported to be preparing
complaints against nylon imports from England and Taiwan.
318
Finally, in August 1993 it was reported that an antidumping complaint
was being prepared against exports from Taiwan of tubes for
protecting electrical wires. 3 9 No further information was found on
these matters.
313 Antidumping Duties Placed on Glass Fibers, supra note 306; S. Korea Sets Anti-
Dumping Duties on Glass Fiber Imports, Dow JONES INTERNATIONAL NEws, Aug.
2, 1994, available in WESTLAW, DJINS.
314 Antidumping Duties Placed on Glass Fibers, supra note 306.
31s U.S. Cigarette Exporters to Face Antidumping Suit, Jin PRESS TICKER SERVICE,
June 28, 1988, available in LEXIS.
316 Seo, supra note 236, at 5 n. 14; I GATT TRADE POLICY REVIEW: KOREA (1992),
supra note 237, at 109.
311 South Korea Accuses Taiwan of Dumping PCs, China Economic News Service,
Oct. 5, 199 1, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
3,' Nylon Cos. to Launch Dumping Suit, KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY, Dec. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"1 Korean Anti-Dumping Claims Grow, KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY, Aug. 6, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, AECON.
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3. Conclusions from South Korea's Antidumping Practice to Date.
What is most striking about South Korean antidumping
practice is the dramatic increase in claims during the 1990s, and, in
contrast to Japan, how many formal petitions are filed, and how many
formal investigations are begun. Some cases, such as those involving
alumina cement, polyacetal resin, or the ball bearings from Thailand,
appear to be efforts to protect new domestic producers of previously
imported products. 20 Other cases, such as the case against
phosphoric acid from China, appear more familiar to an American
observer, as they involve new, low-priced exporters threatening local
production. So long as bilateral and multilateral pressure on South
Korea for open markets remains strong, and so long as South Korea's
balance of trade does not grow into embarrassing surpluses, the
remarkable growth in South Korean antidumping proceedings seem
certain to continue.
C. Taiwan
Taiwan's first modem antidumping law was enacted in June
1984, in a statute specifically for that purpose. The law was
reportedly enacted in conjunction with efforts by Taiwan to lower its
tariff barriers and liberalize imports generally.321 In January, 1993
" This use of antidumping proceedings can be thought of as "Hamiltonian" because
it is based on concerns similar to those referred to by Hamilton in his Report on
Manufactures, in which a late developing, "infant" industry fears predatory dumping
by more advanced, established competitors. There is a clear overlap between
"Hamiltonian" antidumping actions and injury claims based on "material retardation"
of the establishment of a domestic industry, though a "Hamiltonian" action might not
necessarily be based on a claim that the domestic industry had not yet been
established.
321 Taiwan has Adopted an Anti-Dumping Law to Prevent Foreign Countries from
Selling Goods in Taiwan More Cheaply than in Their Own Domestic Markets,
BusINEss TimEs (Singapore), June 19, 1984, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
Taiwan reportedly had some type of antidumping provision as early as 1967, which
was never used. See, MOF To Impose Anti-Dumping Tax on Hulett Aluminium,
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Taiwan enacted its first comprehensive legislation governing
international trade, the Foreign Trade Act ("FTA"), which became
effective February 5, 1993."22 Although the drafting of the FTA
extended over many years, the final version, including the antidumping
provisions, was drafted with Taiwan's 1990 GATT/WTO application
in mind.3" It is therefore not surprising that Taiwan's basic
antidumping law, found in Article 20 of the FTA, follows GATT
antidumping standards. In the same style as Japanese or Korean
legislation, the FTA is a broadly worded statute that must be fleshed
out with implementing legislation.
1. Administrative Organs and Procedure.
Under the 1984 law, Taiwan's antidumping administration was
administered by the Ministry of Finance ("MOF"), which accepted
petitions, conducted dumping and injury investigations, and could
recommend to the Executive Yuan that antidumping duties be
imposed. This administrative structure changed with the enactment
of the 1993 FTA, which creates an International Trade Commission
("ITC")3 24 within the Ministry of Economic Affairs ("MOEA"), and
splits injury and dumping investigations along the lines of the United
States and South Korean systems. Petitions may now be filed with
either the MOF or the MOEA.325 The ITC determines whether the
domestic industry is being injured by the allegedly dumped imports,
while the MOF investigates whether dumping actually occurred. As
China Economic News Service, Sept. 13, 199 1, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
322 For a legal analysis of the FTA, see Sui-Yu Wu, Taiwan's First Comprehensive
Foreign Trade Legislation, EAST AsiuN ExEcUrTivE REPORTS 9, Apr. 1993; Sui-Yu
Wu, New Era of Taiwan's Foreign Trade Regime, 21 INTERNATIONAL BusINEss
LAWYER 369, (1993). For a general analysis, see Tseng, supra note 27.
323 Sui-Yu Wu, New Era of Taiwan's Foreign Trade Regime, supra note 322, at 369;
TSENG, supra note 322.
324 Sui-YuWu, Taiwan's First Comprehensive Foreign Trade Legislation, supra note
322, at 24.
32 MOF, MOEA to Jointly Fight 'Unfair' Competition by Imports, China Economic
News Service, Dec. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
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in the past, the MOF still retains final authority to recommend
antidumping relief measures to the Executive Yuan, which must
approve the recommendation and forward it to the cabinet for
implementation.
The inaugural meeting of the ITC was held in July 1994.326
The ITC is chaired by Economics Minister P.K. Chiang, and is made
up of deputy chiefs of the Ministry of Finance, the Council for
Economic Planning and Development, the Council of Agriculture, plus
eight economists and legal specialists.327 According to Minister
Chiang, the Committee will conform with GATT antidumping
discipline, despite Taiwan's non-GATT/WTO status.
328
2. Practice to Date.
In the eight-and-a-half years from June 1984 to December
1991, the Customs Administration received 14 petitions for unfair
trade relief.3" Of these fourteen, six were rejected, two were
withdrawn after arrangements were reached with the respondents, two
were "put on hold," and four triggered official investigations. 330 In the
single year from December 1991 to December 1992 seven new
petitions were filed, bringing the total from June 1984 to December
1992 to twenty-one, of which twenty were for antidumping relief, and
one was for countervailing duties. 3
In order to assist local industries seeking antidumping
protection, the Executive Yuan's Industrial Development Bureau
(IDB") has helped industry associations in petrochemicals, textiles,
' Import Relief Panel - Stainless Steel Rods, China Economic News Service, July
28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
327 Id.
328 Id.
3' Taiwan Puts Anti-Dumping Duty on Chemical, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Dec.2, 1992,
at 4, available in WESTLAW, WL-WSJA (quoting Mr. Wang Deh-Hwei, Director,
Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance).
330 Id.
331 Id.
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artificial fibers, steel, paper, pharmaceuticals and metal refining
establish "alarm systems" against dumping, and has assisted these
industries in filing antidumping petitions. 33 The government-
sponsored Chinese National Federation of Industries ("CNFI") also
has an Import Relief Committee, which assists particular industries in
preparing and filing antidumping petitions.333 It has been reported that
in certain cases the Executive Yuan has asked the CNFI to provide
such assistance.334 The following are antidumping proceedings that
have been reported to date. Again, these summaries focus on the
economic and commercial effects of these cases, rather than on their
legal aspects.
a. Colored steel plate from South Korea.
In September 1990 an antidumping petition was filed by
Anmau Corporation of Taiwan against color steel sheets exported by
two South Korean steel producers.335 The government began an
investigation and requested information from the South Korean
producers, who provided information in July 1991.336 As of August
1991, the investigation was still underway, and no provisional duties
had been imposed.337
This case is interesting because the petitioner was a joint
venture between Australian, Japanese and Taiwanese investors, with
the Taiwanese partner reportedly only holding 11% of the equity.
338
The case reportedly also marked the first time that South Korean
132 IDB Helping ROC Industy Fight Dumping by Foreign Suppliers, China
Economic News Service, Aug. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"I Id.; Hurt By 'Dumping,' China Economic News Service, May 21, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
" Legislators Urge Government to Investigate ROK's Dumping of Petrochemicals,
China Economic News Service, Dec. 26, 199 1, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
... Taipei Investigating Dumping Charges on ROK Color Steel Sheets, Korea
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exports were assessed antidumping duties by a country outside the
"industrialized" world.339 The South Korean and Taiwanese industry
associations met in Taibei in early September 1991, at which time the
Taiwanese steelmakers reported that South Korean colored steel plate
was selling for $890 per metric ton domestically, compared with $450
per metric ton overseas.34' They also reported that they had filed an
antidumping complaint against colored steel plate from South Africa
several years before, which had been handled diplomatically.3 1
b. Aluminum from South Africa.
In November 1990 the Ministry of Finance announced that it
would investigate a complaint by state-owned China Steel
Corporation against imports of aluminum sheet, plate and foil from a
single South African producer.342 China Steel's petition reportedly
complained that the respondent's products were selling in Taiwan for
approximately $1,300 per ton less than its domestic market price, and
that as a result China Steel had suffered a sharp drop in sales.343
Although it would be necessary to have more information before
drawing any conclusions about China Steel's petition, in the three
previous years (1987-1989) the respondent's exports had accounted
for only 1.25% of Taiwan's total aluminum imports, while the existing
tariff was already 12.5%.
344
In September 1991 the Ministry of Finance recommended to
the Executive Yuan that antidumping duties be imposed on the
339 Id.
340 ROC Makers Accuse South Korea of Dumping Colored Steel Plate, China
Economic News Service, Sept. 6, 199 1, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"' Id, cf MOF to Impose Anti-Dumping Tax on Hulett Aluminum, supra note 321
(in which an MOF official is quoted as saying that the 1990 investigation of Hulett
Aluminum Limited would be Taiwan's first against a South African firm).
3" Taiwan to Probe South African Firm for Dumping, Reuter News Service - Far
East, Nov. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline; MOF to Impose Anti-
Dumping Tax on Hulett Aluminum, supra note 321.
343 Taiwan to Probe South African Firm for Dumping, supra note 342.
344 Id.
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respondent's products, though a Customs Administration official noted
that if the dumping ceased, the investigation would be terminated.
345
c. Sodium dithionite from Japan.
A petition was filed by the Taiwan Association of Acid &
Alkali Industries in August 1991, under the pre-FTA system, alleging
dumping of sodium dithionite from Japan.3"" Sodium dithionite is a
chemical used to bleach textiles. 7 In December 1992 the Ministry of
Finance announced that the Executive Yuan had decided to impose an
antidumping duty of 45.76%, over and above an existing 5% tariff,
raising the effective tariff rate to 50.76%.34 The case marked the
first time Taiwan imposed antidumping duties on imported products.
d. Maleic anhydride from Japan.
The petition was filed in December 1991 by Taiwan's sole
producer of maleic anhydride against a single Japanese exporter.349
Because the case was handled under the 1984 law, the petition was
filed with the Committee on Import Injury Relief of the Chinese
National Federation of Industries, which undertook an initial
investigation.35 The Committee was then to forward its findings to
the MOF, which would decide whether to impose antidumping
duties.351
Although details are not clear, the petitioner appears to have
begun production in April 1991, just eight months before asking for
... MOFto Inpose Anil-Dumping Tax on HulettAluninuin, supra note 321.
346 Taiwan Puts Anti-Dumping Duty on Chemical, supra note 329.
" Taiwan Slaps Anti-Dumping Tax on Japanese Chemical, Reuter Library Report,
Dec. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
348 Id.
14 Taiwan Manufacturer Accuses Fihn of Dumping, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
1991, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA.
350 Id.
351 Id.
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relief.352 Maleic anhydride is an upstream product used in polyester
and alkyd resin production, so having domestic production would fit
into Taiwan's plans to become more self-sufficient in
petrochemicals. 3 3 According to the petitioner, the market price in
Japan was over $1,500 per metric ton, while the respondent was
selling in Taiwan for roughly $510 per metric ton, which was less than
petitioner's cost of production.354
e. Hot and cold-rolled steelfrom Brazil and South Korea.
In September 1992 it was reported that Taiwanese steelmakers
were expected to ask for antidumping relief against imports of hot-
rolled and cold-rolled steel, as well as zinc products from South
Korea.355 In March 1993 the MOF decided to investigate antidumping
petitions filed by the state-run China Steel Corporation against
imports of hot-rolled steel from South Korea and Brazil.356 That same
month China Steel announced that its pre-tax profits and earnings per
share for the last six months of 1992 had dropped by 43% and 45%
respectively from a year earlier, and blamed the declines on price
suppression caused by imports. 357  Sales during the period had
declined by only 0.2% from the previous year.
358
In October 1993 the MOF announced that it would also
352 Id.
313 Id. For a discussion of Taiwan's petrochemical expansion plans, see Claire Tsai,
Petrochemical Expansion Projects in Taiwan - Formosa Plastics Group, BusiNEss
TAiwAN, May 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, TXTFE File.
354 Id.
31 Iron and Steel Maketm to Ask Government to Halt South Korean Dumping, China
Economic News Service, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
TXTFE File.
3 56 Taiwan Holds Steel Dumping Probe for Korea, Brazil, Reuter News Service -
Far East, Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, TXTFE File.
317 China Steel's Profit Fell 43% in 1st Half, AsIAN WALL ST. J. 3, Mar. 25, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL-WSJA 2032298.
358 Id.
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investigate imports of cold-rolled steel from South Korea.?9 The
petition by Taiwanese steel makers complained that steel imports had
increased by a factor of 14.6 times from 1990 to 1992, and that this
had lead to lower prices, increased inventories, and reduced profits for
Taiwanese producers.360
In early March 1994 the MOF announced that it had
recommended to the cabinet that antidumping duties of 13.6% be
imposed on imports of hot-rolled steel plate from South Korea and
Brazil." On March 10, 1994 Korean industry sources reported that
Taiwan was in fact already assessing preliminary antidumping duties
of 13.6%, and that this represented a reversal of an earlier Taiwanese
government decision to accept voluntary export restraints from
Korean steelmakers.362 Taiwanese sources make no reference to
preliminary duties, however, and indicate that as of late April 1994 the
cabinet was reportedly still reviewing the MOF recommendation of
early March.363
f. Steel rod and wire from Brazil and Japan.
Also in March 1994 the MOF recommended to the cabinet
that antidumping duties of between 19.66% and 31.6% be imposed on
steel rod and wire from Brazil.364  The cabinet approved the
recommendation and began imposing the recommended duties
... Taiwan to Investigate Korean Steel Imports, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 3.
360 Id. See also, Taiwan Considers . Korea Duties, AM. METAL MKT. 4, Oct. 5,
1993, available in WESTLAW, AMMTLMKT.
361 Taiwan Proposes Steel Dumping Tax on Brazil, Korea, Reuter News Service -
Far East, March 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
362 Taiwan Slaps (sic) Dumping Duties on Korean Thick Steel Plates, KOREA
ECONOMIC DAILY, March 12, 1994, available in WESTLAW, KOREAECON.
0 Taiwan Starts Duties on Brazil Steel Rod/Wire, Reuter News Service - Far East,
April 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
3' Taiwan Proposes Steel Dumping Tax on Brazil, Korea, Reuter News Service -
Far East, March 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
1996-97] STATES, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES & ANTIDUMPING 375
effective April 25, 1994.36
In July 1994 the newly-formed Trade Investigation Committee
of the MOEA assigned one of its members to investigate a charge of
dumping made by a Taiwanese company against steel rods and wires
from Japan.3
g. Plypropylene and high and low density polyethylene from
Japan and South Korea.
High density polyethylene (HDPE), low density polyethylene
(LDPE), and polypropylene (PP) are petrochemical raw materials used
in plastic products, and although separate antidumping petitions were
filed, they will be treated together here.
Antidumping actions against all three products began in
August 1992, when Taiwan's largest PP and polyethylene (PE)
producers petitioned for antidumping relief against PP and PE imports
from South Korea and Japan.367 The timing of the actions seems to
have been related to the deterioration in Taiwan-South Korea relations
brought about by South Korea's switch of diplomatic recognition from
Taiwan to the People's Republic of China.368 Although conditions for
antidumping relief seem to have been ripe in late 1992, it appears that
no action was taken on the case for over one year.
In October 1993, the ITC held a public hearing on the matters,
attended by representatives of both petitioners and exporters.369 The
petitioners complained that over-capacity in South Korea was leading
to dumping on the Taiwanese market, resulting in increased import
' Taiwan Starts Duties on Brazil Steel Rod/Wire, Reuter News Service -Far East,
Reuter Economic News, April 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
31 Import Relief Panel - Stainless Steel Rods, China Economic News Service, July
28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline. It is not clear from the source whether
a formal petition was filed.
3 Taiwan Taking HardLine ofDumping, WALL ST. J. September 4, 1992, available
in WESTLAW, WL-WSJ 4.
368 Id.
'6 Petrochemical Firms Declare War on Korean Dumping, China Economic News
Service, October 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
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penetration.370  In December 1993 the MOF took action,
recommending to the Executive Yuan that preliminary antidumping
duties of 7% to 30% be imposed on South Korean HDPE and
LDPE.37 At the same time, the MOF decided to postpone action on
PP imports until March 1994.372
In mid-February 1994, before even preliminary duties on PE
had been imposed, it was reported that South Korean producers were
offering voluntary volume restraints and minimum C&F price
restraints on HDPE, LDPE and PP in exchange for assurances that
Taiwan would reduce or eliminate the antidumping duties. 373 These
negotiations evidently came to naught, because on February 25, 1994
the Executive Yuan imposed provisional antidumping duties of 6.7%
to 29.1% on HDPE and LDPE from South Korea, marking the first
time Taiwan had imposed provisional antidumping. 374 At roughly the
same time, the MOF also recommended four-month provisional
antidumping duties ranging from 6.57% to 110.68% on PP from
South Korea and Japan.375
In mid-March 1994 the MOF proposed final antidumping
duties on imports of PP from South Korea and Japan, HDPE and
LDPE from Korea. 76 The proposed duties on PP ranged from 4.77%
to 68.71%, and those on HDPE and LDPE from 4.17% to 9.45%.377
370 Id.
37 Trade Update: Taiwan to Impose Tariffs on Korean PE Inports, PLATr's INT'
PEMROCHEMIcALREP., December 23, 1993, available in WESTLAW, PLATTIPR 6.
372 Id.
313 Trade Update: Korea and Taiwan in Talks Over Polymer Import Quotas and
Duties, PLA-T'S INT'L PETROCHEMICAL REP. 5, February 17, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, PLATTIPR 5.
374 Asian-Pacific Brief. Taiwanese Antidumping Duties, AsIAN WALL ST. J. 12,
February 28, 1994, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 12; Claire Tsai, Japanese,
Korean Petrochemical Imports Hit with Anti-Dumping Duty, BusI N.ss TAMWAN,
March 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
375 Taiwan Set to Impose Interim Duties on Japanese and Korean PP, PLATT'S INT'L
PETROCHEMICALREP. 1, March 3, 1994, available in WESTLAW, PLATTIPR 1.
376 Taiwan Proposes Dumping Duties on Japan, Korea, Reuter News Service - Far
East, Mar. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
377 Id.
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In April 1994 a panel of the Executive Yuan approved the
MOF proposal for antidumping duties of 4.17% to 9.45% on HDPE
and LDPE from South Korea, and sent their approval to the cabinet
for final approval and implementation. 378 The duties went into effect
in mid-May 1994.3' 9  Then, also in mid-May 1994 the cabinet
approved final antidumping duties of 5.16% to 68.71% on PP imports
from ten Japanese producers, and 4.77% to 35.01% on PP imports
from eight South Korean producers, to become effective for June
1994 shipments.380
Despite the nearly two years spent considering these matters,
it quickly became apparent that economic implications had been
thought through. By August 1994 a split had appeared between
domestic PE and PP producers, who had asked for antidumping relief,
and the domestic downstream users of PE and PP, who were unhappy
about having to pay higher prices for their inputs.381 The downstream
processors charged that, with protections in place, the domestic
producers were unable to meet demand and were raising their prices,
and therefore asked the MOF to revoke the recently implemented
duties. 382  The 8,000 domestic processors, represented by the
Association of Finished Plastics Products, constitute an $11.5 billion
industry, account for 5.6% of all industrial production, employ over
180,000, and had export earnings of $5.05 billion, roughly 6% of
Taiwan's total exports. 3 3  The processors rely upon imports for
378 Korean Plastics - Anti-Dumping Duties to be 1imposed on Polyethylene, China
Economic News Service, Apr. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
... Taiwan to Levy Dumping Duties on S.Korea, Reuter News Service - Far East,
May 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
... Taiwan Slaps Dumping Surcharges on Japan, ROK Homopolymners, PLAII'S
Imt'LPETROCHEMICAL REP. 8, May 19, 1994, available in WESTLAW, PLATTIPR
8; Comline News Service, June 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"' Downstream PP, PEProcessors Askfor End to Dumping Duty, China Economic
News Service, Aug. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
32 Id.
38 Taiwan Processors Oppose Dumnping Duties, Stephen Moore ed., 24 Mod.
Plastics 16B, Dec. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, MODPLST 16B.
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roughly 50% of their HDPE, LDPE and PP needs, 384 and were being
hurt by price increases of 20% to 50% from a year earlier.35
The MOF met on August 30, 1994 to discuss the matter, and
reportedly announced that the antidumping duties on both PP and PE
from South Korea would be rescinded September 1, 1994.386 A
procedural snag appears to have arisen with regard to revoking the
final duties, however, caused by the fact that Taiwan's antidumping
law would require a reversal of the dumping determination in order to
revoke final duties. 387 In September the Executive Yuan reportedly
announced that it would undertake a one-month investigation to
determine whether dumping had actually occurred. 388  Then, in
October, an ITC investigation reportedly found that domestic
producers were no longer being injured by PP and PE imports, but the
ITC decided to continue monitoring the market situation.38 9
In October the MOF announced that it would partially
rescinded the antidumping duties on Japanese PP, leaving duties on
Japanese PE in place.39 Then in December 1994, with all duties
apparently still in force, the MOF announced that it would reopen
both the PP and PE investigations. 391 In late January the ITC
completed its second reinvestigation of market conditions, again
finding that conditions for domestic producers were improving.392
384 Id.
3" Taiwan to Abolish Dumping Tariff on South Korean PE, PP, JAPAN CHEMICAL
WEEK, Sept. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
3
96Id.
3" Taiwanese Polymer Processors Call for Re-Think on Tariffs, 13 Platt's Int'l
Petrochemical Rep. 4, Sept. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS.
3g8 Id.
3 Gov[erunent] Expected to Soon Suspend Dumping Duties on Korea, Japan,
China Economic News Service, January 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Reuter
Textline.
3 OMOFto Partially Lift Anti-Dumping Rate on Japanese PP, PE, China Economic
News Service, Oct. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
39'Platt's News Digest: Asia Anti-Dumping, 13 Platt's Int'l Petrochemical Rep. 8,
available in WESTLAW, PLATTIPR 8.
" Gov[ernnient/ Expected to Soon Suspend Dumping Duties on Korea, Japan,
supra note 389.
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These results were forwarded to the MOF, whose parallel
investigation still needed to find that no dumping had occurred in
order for the duties to be rescinded.393
h. PBT engineering plastic from South Korea.
In early 1991 the Taiwan Plastic Materials Manufacturers'
Association, assisted by the Import Relief Commission of the CNFI,
successfully petitioned the MOF to investigate dumping of PBT by
Korean producers.3" Data supplied by the domestic industry showed
Korean over-capacity, dumping, and a doubling of import penetration,
from 5.6% to 10.6%.39' The Import Relief Commission reportedly
urged the Korean exporters to raise their prices for the Taiwan
market,396 and the lack of further action on the matter suggests that
this is how it was resolved.
i. Styrene monomer ("SM') and carbon black from South
Korea.
In August 1993, while investigations into South Korean PE
and PP exports were ongoing, investigations were also begun into
South Korean exports of styrene monomer ("SM") and carbon
black.3" The South Korean producers reportedly urged government-
level action,398 and the matter seems to have been settled without
duties being imposed.
" Id.; Taiwan's Dumping Duties, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., Jan. 24, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, DJINS.
39 ROC Makers Say South Korea id Dumping PBT Plastic Material, China
Economic News Service, Apr. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
395 Id.
396 Id.
" Taiwan Moving to File Dumping Charges on Two More Petrochemical Products,
KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY, Aug. 7, 1993, available in WESTLAW, KOREAECON.
39 Id.
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j. Cellulose nitrates (nitrocellulose) from Brazil.
An investigation was begun into imports of cellulose nitrates
from Brazil, and in February 1994, provisional duties were imposed,
while the investigation continued.399
k. Paper pulp from the United States, Canada, Brazil and
Indonesia.
In November 1994 the MOF concluded an investigation into
alleged dumping of paper pulp by twelve exporters from the United
States, Canada, Brazil and Indonesia.4 ' The investigation, which was
in response to a petition by two Taiwanese pulp makers, found
dumping margins ranging from 5.59% to 63.23% on pulp imported
from the four nations between late 1990 and early 1993 .41 However,
rather than immediately recommending to the Executive Yuan that
duties be imposed, the MOF allowed the respondents a one month
grace period to raise their prices, in which case antidumping duties
could be avoided.4 2 In mid-December the MOF announced that it
would recommend antidumping duties of between 15.92% and
63.23% on pulp from Brazil and Canada, but because United States
and Indonesian exporters had provided price undertakings their pulp
would not affected.40 3 The MOF noted further, however, that pulp
from any United States or Indonesian exporters who failed to provide
price undertakings would be subject to duties of 14.28% to 24.3 3%.404
" Asian-Pacific Briefi Taiwanese Antidumping Duties, AsIAN WALL ST. J. 12, Feb.
28, 1994, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA 12.




403 Taiwan Levies Dumping Duties on Foreign Firms, Reuter News Service - Far
East, Dec. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
404 Paper Dumping, China Economic News Service, Dec. 17, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
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I. Cotton yarn from Pakistan.
In 1993 the Taiwan Cotton Spinners Association petitioned for
antidumping relief from cotton yarn imports from Pakistan." 5 The
petition seems to have relied upon a 1992 study, privately
commissioned by the Association, that found that Pakistani cotton
yarn was being dumped in Taiwan.40 6 In November 1994 the MOF
announced that it would begin an investigation,4 7 and in February
1995 the Trade Investigation Committee announced its determination
that local producers were being injured by dumped Pakistani cotton
yam. Under the new bifurcated procedure the Tariff Commission of
the MOF then needed to reach a final determination that dumping had
occurred. °s
m. Other miscellaneous antidumping actions.
In June 1992 it was reported that Taiwanese machine tool
makers had asked the government to take action against dumping of
Japanese machine tools.' In September 1993, while other steel cases
were being investigated,4 0 the Taiwan Steel and Iron Industrial
Association complained of dumping by Thai steel producers, and
indicated that it would file an antidumping petition if its negotiations
with Thai exporters were not successful.41 In October 1993 it was
... Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., Feb. 9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, DJINS.
" The study was carried out jointly by the accounting firm of Wang and Tang, and
the law firm of Lee and Li. TCSA Charges Pakistan with Dumping Cotton Yarn,
China Economic News Service, June 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
407 Paper Dumping - Duty Rates, China Economic News Service, Nov. 9, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
' Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., Feb. 9, 1995, supra note 405 (referring to the Trade
Investigation Committee as the "International Trade Commission").
' Machine Tool Makers Complain ofJapanese Dumping, China Economic News
Service, June 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
4o See supra notes 355-66 and accompanying text.
4" Taiwanese Seek Talks with Steel Exporters, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 14, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
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reported that the Taiwan Silk and Filament Weaving Industrial
Association was investigating imports of synthetic fibers and woven
fabrics from Korea, and that an antidumping petition would be filed.412
In addition, until January 1995, a United States pharmaceutical
company's exports of hepatitis-B products were being monitored by
the MOF in connection with a price undertaking the company had
offered in response to an antidumping investigation. 3 After five
years of monitoring the MOF has indicated that the investigation will
be terminated.414
3. Conclusions from Taiwan's Antidumping Practice to Date.
Taiwan's antidumping enforcement is much closer to South
Korea's than to Japan's, no doubt partly reflecting similarities in the
levels of development of the two nations. Taiwan is therefore likely
to feel pressure to grant "Hamiltonian" antidumping relief, as it
appears to have done in the maleic anhydride case, as well as the more
typical antidumping relief for established but no longer competitive
industries. Petrochemical imports pose a special problem for Taiwan,
as its relatively open markets have made it a "dumping" ground for
excess capacity in South Korea and Japan, which stymies Taiwan's
efforts to increase its own petrochemical capacity. Like South Korea,
Taiwan is now facing competition from labor intensive imports where
it is no longer competitive, while at the same time it is trying to
improve its own technological level and reduce its reliance on high
technology imports. Like South Korea, Taiwan is also moving rapidly
toward a more pluralistic and law-centered economic order, in which
it will be increasingly difficult for the government to avoid taking
action on antidumping complaints from its citizens, which it appears
to have done in the past for diplomatic reasons. What may work to
4"2 Fabric Manufacturers Protest Korean Dumping Here, China Economic News
Service, Oct. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
"' Taiwan Ends Dumping Procedures on Abbott, Reuter News Service - Far East,
Jan. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, Reuter Textline.
414 Id.
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constrain Taiwan's antidumping practices are its move to become a
WTO member, and its need to maintain political ties around the world.
These concerns aside, antidumping enforcement in Taiwan is likely to
grow as its markets become increasingly open.
VI. PROJECTIONS ABOUT FUTURE ANTIDUMPING PRACTICES OF
JAPAN, SouTH KOREA AND TAIWAN
Having described the state-centered capitalist development
industrial policies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and having also
looked at the actual antidumping practices of the three nations, it is
now possible to attempt some general predictions about their future
antidumping practices. Certain factors seem to favor convergence
among antidumping practices in these three nations, while other
factors are indeterminate, and still other factors suggest divergent
antidumping enforcement.
A. Harmonizing National Antidumping Practices and the Quest for
Predictability in the World Trading System
The tightening of GATT standards for antidumping practices
and for dispute resolution favor harmonization among antidumping
practices worldwide. To understand the attention given to national
antidumping practices it is helpful to think of the Bretton Woods
system as an attempt to "lock-in" free markets on a global scale, thus
avoiding the escalating protectionism that occurred in the 1920s and
1930s. If one accepts the Weberian thesis that capitalism on the
national level depends upon a legal system that guarantees the
predictability of market transactions and that enjoys relative autonomy
from narrow political considerations,415 then at the international level
the existence of national discretion in granting antidumping relief may
4"5 For a summary of Weber's "rational" legal system I have relied primarily upon
David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wisc. L.
REv. 720, and David M. Trubek Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE LAW JOURNAL 39 (1972).
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be a hinderance to the project of creating a global market economy.41
Antidumping relief is sought after contracts have been
concluded and at least partially performed, and therefore it is difficult
to anticipate if standing and other requirements for bringing
antidumping actions are loose. Because antidumping petitions are
difficult to predict in advance, if any predictability at all can be
installed in the system it will be through transparent and consistent
enforcement of antidumping laws once cases enter the national
systems. As noted above, this requires either harmonization among
national systems to the greatest extent possible, or strict GATT
discipline over unharmonized, but disciplined, national antidumping
regimes. Second, antidumping relief is requested by outsiders, for
what are normally two-party transactions, and although their interests
could conceivably be factored into contract terms, they are by
definition competitors of the importers." 7 Agreeing at the outset to
import at a higher price in order to avoid antidumping petitions would
undermine the competitive logic of the market system, and could lead
to "transfer pricing" problems with the taxing authorities of the
importing nation where transactions are between affiliates. Finally,
unpredictability has been exacerbated by the fact that national
antidumping systems have not functioned autonomously from political
interests.418 In spite of their legal trappings, antidumping decisions
involve tariff policy, which, as an element of national sovereignty, is
inherently political. One great virtue of formal tariffs is that they are
transparent and predictable, whereas dumping enforcement is not.
Ironically, the more effective the GATT/WTO is in removing tariffs
as a tool of national trade policy, the more pressure is likely to arise
'" Predictability would be served by either a complete absence of national
antidumping mechanisms, or by strong GATT supervision of national antidumping
regimes to remove their political, unpredictable, aspects. Harmonization among
national systems would not be strictly necessary, so long as each national system was
predictable on its own terms. However, to the extent that national systems remain free
from GATT control they are likely to retain their political, unpredictable aspects.
"' Petitioners must buy producers of 'like products,' or must represent the industry of
such producers. GATT, supra note 7, at art VI.
4"" On the United States, see JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1993).
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for unpredictable protectionist measures such as antidumping relief.
This in turn creates the need for a more legalistic GATT/WTO
structure to reintroduce predictability.
GATT has been moving gradually toward less national
discretion in antidumping administration through the creation of the
Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round Antidumping Codes, which
provide more detailed standards for importing governments to follow
when taking antidumping actions." 9 The second major means by
which GATT has attacked national discretion in the antidumping area,
and in others, has been by strengthening GATT dispute resolution
mechanisms. Whereas early GATT disputes were resolved through
multilateral diplomacy, since approximately 1955 GATT disputes have
been referred to panels of three to five independent experts, who are
directed to "arrive impartially at the truth of the facts and the best
interpretation of the law."4 ' This "legalization" of GATT dispute
resolution continued with the 1979 adoption of the Tokyo Round
"Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance,""42 which functioned as a sort of
"Restatement" of GATT dispute resolution procedures.4 2 Writing
before the creation of the WTO Charter, John Jackson made the
Weberian case for "legalized" dispute resolution in the following
terms:
[T]t must be recognized that in most cases it is not the
resolution of the specific dispute under consideration
which is most important. Rather, it is the efficient and
just future functioning of the overall system which is
the primary goal of a dispute-settlement procedure.
419 See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. An alternative source of
predictability would "manage" trade, which is equally attractive to the exporter, but
which does not satisfy the efficiency demands of the market-oriented approach.
420 Jackson, supra note 1, at 95.
421 GATT, B.I.S.D (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [hereinafter Dispute Resolution
Understanding].
422 Jackson, supra note 1, at 96.
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Thus, it may be more important to clarify andprovide
predictive guidance about the application of a rule,
than it is to determine that a judgment' is acceptable to
either or both parties of the immediate dispute."z
Of course, the infamous "failure" of this method was that the
panels were not judicial in nature, and thus issued "reports" rather
than "decisions." Panel reports could be adopted by the members,
thus authorizing countermeasures by the complaining member, but
adoption required the unanimous approval all members. Members
who "lost" in panel decisions were therefore able to prevent panel
reports from having any binding effect.
Rationalization of GATT dispute resolution took a major step
forward with the adoption of the WTO Charter, which includes an
enhanced "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes" as its Annex 2.424 Under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, panel reports no longer need to be adopted
by all members to become effective, but instead will become effective
unless the new Dispute Resolution Body decides by consensus not to
approve the report.4 25 Consensus requires that no member present at
the relevant meeting of the Dispute Resolution Body formally object
to the decision, 21 so in effect, a panel report supported by even one
member cannot be blocked. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
thus advances the intended role of WTO dispute settlement as "a
central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system.
4 7
How this legalization project will affect Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan remains to be seen. If Japan continues its practice of
avoiding formal antidumping actions, it is likely to benefit overall from
the additional discipline the new regime will impose on Japan's export
" Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
424 WTO Charter, supra note 7, at Annex 2.
42 Id. at art. 16(3).
426 Id. at art. 3, n. 1.
... Id. at art. 3(2)(emphasis added).
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markets. Taiwan's antidumping practice is already largely constrained
by the GATT framework, but until Taiwan becomes a member of the
WTO it will not be subject to the WTO's dispute resolution discipline,
so only one of the two legalization tools will affect Taiwan. South
Korea may have the most difficulty with this increased discipline,
because while it is under increasing WTO and bilateral pressures to
liberalize imports, South Korea does not accumulate the huge trade
surpluses of Japan and Taiwan. This increased discipline therefore
threatens one of South Korea's protectionist tools at a somewhat
difficult time.428
B. Hegemony of Protectionist Ideology
A second factor common to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
that can be expected to influence antidumping enforcement is a shared
ideological attachment to Listian protectionism that arises out of the
capitalist development industrial policy. As was discussed above,
protectionism was an element of Japan's industrial policy that was
later adopted by both South Korea and Taiwan. That Japan, and later
South Korea and Taiwan, adopted protectionist measures during
initial industrial development should come as no surprise, but for
Americans seeking to understand protectionist ideology in these
countries, it may be useful to look at protectionist ideology in
nineteenth century America, when this country was undergoing
industrialization.
1. Comparison with Nineteenth Century United States.
In post-GATT America, free trade rhetoric and ideology has
achieved remarkable hegemony, to the extent that "protectionist" has
428 For a summary of structural problems arguably inherent in South Korea's
development strategy, see Hart-Landsberg, supra note 123, at 282-307.
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taken on a connotation akin to "Luddite."4"9 This is somewhat ironic,
however, because protectionist theories enjoyed a similar degree of
hegemony through the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries;
a time when America was experiencing enormous industrial
expansion.430 Although Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other
English free trade theorists were well known in America, strategic
Listian protectionism was consistently advocated as the means to
develop domestic industry. While before the Civil War there had been
genuine political debate over the merits of free trade versus
protectionism, 431 in the latter half of the nineteenth century the
Republican Party was consistently protectionist, while the Democratic
Party proposed tariff reforms that did not challenge the basic
protectionist system. 32 Although the European countries were not as
protectionist as the United States, only Great Britain advocated free
trade,433 and her attitude was rightly seen by both Democrats and
Republicans as an element of British imperialism.4 34 As the world's
preeminent industrial and trading power, Britain's interests were best
served by free access to others markets, and because they were far
ahead technologically the British felt they had little to fear from
imports.435
A large number of Americans now seem to view protection for
industry as a sort of dirty favor negotiated between "special interests"
4" See generally, COLDSTEIN, supra note 16. This is not to suggest that protectionist
sentiments are not alive and well in the United States, but protectionism has been
forced into an ideological and rhetorical "underground." Any sophisticated
protectionist will now employ euphemisms such as "level playing field," or "fair trade,"
with the result that these phrases have themselves become tainted.
430 Id.
"' Opposition to protectionism came from Southern agricultural interests, who
imported their machinery, and from Northern trading interests. Pro-protection calls
were primarily from Northern manufacturers. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 95.
434 Id. at 128. According to HUDSON, supra note 14, the fact Britain's leaders saw free
trade primarily as a way to further national interests has been largely ignored by later
free trade economists.
13s The parallels with America in the 1950s and 1960s are striking.
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and weak politicians, usually in Congress, but sometimes in the Oval
Office. Consistent with free trade theory, protectionism is seen as
coming at the expense of the general welfare.4 36 While these views
may reflect political and economic reality, they are diametrically
opposed to the protectionist tradition of nineteenth century America,
which I believe has many parallels in the trade policies of Japan, later
adopted by South Korea and Taiwan.
In the first half of the nineteenth century the primary
protectionists were the Federalists, and later the American Whigs. In
his 1791 Report on Manufactures, Alexander Hamilton stated,
[T]he influence of habit, the fear of failure, the
inequalities existing between nations in point of
industrial organization, the granting of aid to
established industries by rival nations, and the
concerted action of competitors through the media of
dumping, underselling, extension of long-term credit
and other devices might easily ruin or seriously hamper
the existence of any newly established industry.
43 7
Hamilton, and later the American Whigs, believed in active
government intervention to support industry, and felt that supporting
developing industries included providing protection from imports.438
The public interest was seen to be coterminous with economic
' BHAGWATI, supra note 6; Bovard, supra note 418; cf James Brander, Rationales
for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy, in Paul R. Krugman (ed.) STRATEGIC
TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1986).
411 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1904)(cited in
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 31).
' The American Whigs were opposed by the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democrats
on the grounds that protection for industry enriched industrialists at the expense of the
consuming public, and because Southern Democrats represented agricultural interests
who needed to import equipment and who were less interested in
industrialization.GOLDSTEfn,, supra note 16, at 33-74.
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growth, rather than with economic efficiency,439 which parallels
distinctions made between "efficient" and "effective" economic policy
in Japan. This Whig belief in government intervention in the economy
to support industry is barely alive in American political debate circa
1995,' but it has direct parallels with the industrial policies discussed
here.
The Whigs espoused a national unity of interests among all
Americans, which denied the inevitability of class conflict. This seems
to be a common stance among protectionists, presumably because
they seek to justify protection on the basis of long term national goals
such as industrial development or agricultural self-sufficiency.44" ' This
also has its counterpart in modern Japan, which, as we have seen,
looked for ways to industrialize without the class conflict Europe had
experienced." 2 The architects of Japan's industrial policy seem to
have felt a similar commitment to placing economic growth before
efficiency, where efficiency is defined in terms of a static economic
model.
After the Civil War the Whig party was replaced by the
Republicans as the party of industry, and protectionist economics
increased its hold on political debate.443 Although nineteenth century
411 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780 TO 1860, at
260-61 (1977)(associating the imperative for economic growth with instrumentality
in the law).
440 The Clinton Administration includes advocates of a more active American
industrial policy, notably Robert Reich and Laura Tyson, but with a Republican
majority in Congress that wants to abolish the Commerce Department, it seems
unlikely that any funding will be available for proactive industrial policy measures.
" To deny the existence of a national good separate from the aggregate of individual
interests, as free trade rhetoric does, complicates a protectionist program because it
implies that an accurate cost/benefit analysis can be done for any protectionist
measure. Whether or not the protectionists were right to claim a value for such
national interests, doing so makes the weighing of interests more difficult, or even
impossible.
442 Supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
" On the dominance of protectionist ideology between the Civil War and the Great
Depression, see COLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 81-136.
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America is sometimes seen as a high point of laissez faire and Social
Darwinism, these doctrines were never extended to the point of
subjecting American industry to international competition.
2. "Stickiness" of Protectionist Ideology.
In her study of United States trade policy, Judith Goldstein
argues that it was only the shocks of the Great Depression, the
Democratic party's takeover of Congress and the Presidency, and
World War II that allowed free trade ideology to become dominant in
the United States.' These shocks were required before political
change could occur, even though academia had abandoned
protectionist economic theories much earlier. Political elites had been
educated in free trade ideology for 30 to 40 years before the political
change came, and the political change came long after economic
conditions indicated that America's economic interests would have
been better served by freer trade."'
I believe that protectionist thought is as hegemonic in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan today as it was in America until the early
twentieth century, by which I mean that most people believe that
protection of domestic industry, even if it results in higher prices, is
basically the correct policy, and good for their countries. Although
protectionism in these nations is not enforced by "log-rolling"
politicians as it was in pre-1934 America, because the industrial policy
bureaucracies are more insulated than the United States government
from political forces, it may be that these countries will retain their
protectionist orientations even longer than did the United States. If
the Uruguay Round had failed over Japan's and South Korea's
protection of their agricultural markets, for example, it might have
provoked the kind of ideological realignment that occurred in America
in the 1930s. Short of that kind of shock, however, it appears that
GATT and bilateral pressures to liberalize will not affect the
... Id. at 136-139.
"I Id. at 88, 135-36.
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underlying protectionist ideology, but will be seen as simply a price
that must be paid to ensure access to foreign markets. Even if local
leaders in Japan, South Korea or Taiwan believe strongly in free trade
they do not need to say so publicly, and doing so would only invite a
protectionist backlash. They can pursue import liberalization while
casting it as foreign pressure, and thus avoid the politically risky and
difficult task of trying to sell the populace on free trade as a guiding
ideology.
Although both political parties in the United States have their
protectionist moments, the Republican party includes free trade as a
consistent. element of its political platform, while the more
conservative wing of the Democratic party generally agrees. This type
of political commitment to free trade seems absent in the nations
discussed here, at least so far. This may reflect a basic difference in
political economies, because whereas labor in the United States is now
too weak to bring about broad protectionism, even if it wished to, in
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan it seems that one of the ways labor
has been kept weak is though an implied promise of protectionism to
avoid market-driven layoffs.446 For these nations to truly abandon
protectionism might require a drastic realignment of their societies.
3. New Confidence in Protectionist Ideology.
Although economic progress is usually equated with financial
and trade liberalization, the new self-confidence Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan are demonstrating in their dealings with the West may
actually work against an ideological reorientation toward free trade.447
This self-confidence is evident in new relativist formulations of "Asian
democracy," "Asian human rights," and "Confucian values," but in
446 I would not suggest that this has been the only way labor has been kept weak in
these nations, but I do believe an inplied promise of little import competition can play
a role in pre-empting labor activism.
47 From THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY 'No' to Lee Kwan Yu's discourses on the failings
of Western liberal democracy, to the rehabilitation of Confucius in the People's
Republic of China, this phenomenon is operating in many areas.
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economics it sometimes appears as a form of "Asian exceptionalism,"
reminiscent of the "exceptionalism" proclaimed by nineteenth century
Americans." 8 Northeast Asia's industrial policies are now beginning
to be laid out in public, for example, in the World Bank's Asian
MYfiracle Report,"9 and to the extent that free trade ideology is seen as
a foreign ideology that conflicts with what has been working so well,
growing economic and social self-confidence may make rejection
easier. As was the case with the United States in the nineteenth
century, these countries that are developing successfully with
protectionist policies may see calls for free trade by their trading
partners as simply self-serving.
4. GATT Membership and the Maintenance of Protectionist
Ideology.
Japan and South Korea have benefitted greatly from the
GATT's historical practice of accepting nations with protectionist
trade regimes, then using GATT discipline to force liberalization. This
practice, which certainly seems related to the role of the Bretton
Woods system in the Cold War, highlights one of the contradictions
between free trade rhetoric and GATT practice. Free trade rhetoric,
based on Ricardian comparative advantage, holds that any country will
benefit most from freeing imports and exporting those products in
which it holds a comparative advantage. The GATT's practice,
however, seems to admit that a developing country benefits most
when it can export relatively freely, while still being able to control
imports. This is of course the essence of the export-driven
' This recalls the "exceptionalism" felt by nineteenth century Americans, which held
that America's unique circumstances allowed it to avoid the class strife which began
plaguing Europe as industrialization proceeded. On the relationship between
exceptionalism and protectionist ideology in America, see Goldstein, supra note 16,
at 34, 86-87. Japan's lifetime employment system, though in the best of times only
applicable to certain segments of the workforce, is one facet of this "exceptionalism"
that is now under severe strain.
49 WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993).
394 BUFFALO JOURNTAL OF INTERATIONAL LAW [Vol.3
development model, but it contradicts free trade theory to the extent
that it extends beyond "infant" industry protection. The alternative
policy for the GATT would have been to demand real liberalization as
a condition of GATT entry, which would have forced countries to
make the difficult adjustments prior to entry, and would certainly have
delayed entry for many developing countries.
An important aspect of this "join, then liberalize" pattern has
been that it inadvertently encourages the use of nationalism as a tool
of protectionism. Rather than forcing prospective members to
undertake the difficult political task of selling their populaces on the
benefits of freeing imports as well as exports, the reality, at least in the
countries discussed here, has been that the governments have been
able to cast import liberalization as the result of foreign pressure.
Given the history of Western Imperialism in Asia, the colonization of
Taiwan and Korea, and Japan's defeat in World War II, any of these
governments can easily tap into a reserve of nationalism if they portray
themselves as resisting foreign trade pressure.
Import liberalization has also been largely separated from the
ability to export by the fact that the ability to export, particularly to
the United States market, came before real pressure to liberalize
imports began. In a sense, publics became used to the idea that a
product need only be good and cheap to compete on the United States
market, while never being forced to take the same view of foreign
products in their own markets. This situation has been exacerbated in
South Korea by the way in which imports have been carried out and
publicized. Although South Korea imports a wide range of products,
from grain to machine tools to cosmetics, it is "luxury" consumer
good imports that become the center of media and public attention.
In addition, controlling imports through import licensing has
tended to favor those who have government connections or access to
independent sources of hard currency. At least in the South Korean
context, this has tended to associate importing with cronyism and
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privilege.4  Korean importers of consumer goods are often connected
in some way to chaebols or chaebol families, because they have
independent sources of capital not subject to government credit
allocation policies. It is therefore quite easy for protectionists to
exploit class antagonisms to decry such imports, though from a strict
consumer welfare perspective, middle and lower class consumers
would certainly benefit from lower priced imports.
If these suggestions about the strength of protectionist
ideology in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are correct, antidumping
enforcement is unlikely to encounter the sustained, ideological attacks
that it does in the United States. This is not to say that ideology alone
can determine trade policy outcomes, but so long as protectionism is
a generally accepted trade orientation, enforcers of antidumping
regimes will have more political space to protect local producers,
should they choose to do so.
C. "Strong" Bureaucracies and the Lack of Effective Judicial
Review of Antidumping Actions
The rule of law in the Western liberal conception requires that
the state also be subject to the laws of the land. In modern terms this
entails, inter alia, that bureaucratic discretion be exercised only within
limits allowed by law, and that private parties have the right to obtain
court review of bureaucratic measures. Weber and others have
argued that a state's adherence to the rule of law increases its
legitimacy, and thus its strength,451 and this element of the liberal
paradigm has been enshrined in the legal systems of Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan. Antidumping determinations are state actions
with potentially substantial effects on a range of parties in society, so
one would expect judicial review of antidumping determinations to be
available in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In addition, Article 13
of the Antidumping Code provides that each member having an
450 This began during the Rhee regime, and continues to this day. On rents earned
through importing during the Rhee regime, see Woo, supra note 36, at 67.
451 Trubeck, supra note 415, at 749.
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antidumping regime shall maintain mechanisms for review of that
regime's decisions. 52 Since the Antidumping Code was enacted in
1979, judicial review of antidumping determinations has become
widespread in traditionally active antidumping jurisdictions such as the
United States and the European Union.45 3
Yet, administrative review arguably exists in considerable
tension with elements of the capitalist development state discussed
here." Particularly in the economic sphere, such a state must be able
to implement its economic agenda generally free from capture by
private interests. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have clearly been
strong states in this sense,55 largely through their professionalized and
relatively insulated bureaucracies. Part of the "insulation" for which
these bureaucracies are known, however, arises from the reality that
their decisions are seldom subject to outside review. This
phenomenon extends to decisions made in connection with
antidumping enforcement.
1. Judicial Review of Antidumping Decisions in Japan.
In democratic Japan, limitations on judicial review are
maintained largely through discretion-enhancing interpretations of
justiciability, standing, and scope of bureaucratic discretion.456 To be
... The Antidumping Code requires that "[e]ach Member shall maintain judicial,
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the
prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews
of determinations ... Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the
authorities responsible for the determination or review in question." Antidumping
Code, supra note 19, art. 13.
"' Edwin A. Vermulst, The Anliduniping Systems ofAustralia, Canada, the EEC
andthe USA, in ANTDUMPrNG LAW AND PRACTICE: A CoNPARATIVE STUDY 425,429
(John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
"" For an in-depth exploration of this problem, see FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (I 987)(especially Chapter 5: Legal Informality
and Industrial Policy).
... Though, with its relatively advanced democracy postwar, Japan has had to be more
creative than the other two in maintaining its leadership role.
456 UPHAM, supra note 454, at 170.
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reviewable under the Administrative Case Litigation Law (ACLL), an
agency action must constitute an "administrative disposition or other
exercise of public power," which standard has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as limited to administrative acts that "immediately and
directly create or delimit private rights and duties."4 7  If this
justiciability hurdle is overcome, a potential plaintiff must then
demonstrate injury to its "legal" as opposed to "factual" interests.sS
Finally, ifjusticiability and standing are shown, the potential plaintiff
must then demonstrate that the government agency acted outside the
scope of the authority granted to it under the relevant statute.
459
Although in environmental litigation and other areas these
threshold barriers have perhaps been lowered in recent decades,
typical industrial policy measures remain beyond the reach of judicial
review. Justiciability is avoided because most industrial policy
measures are informal, and thus not the final and legally formal acts
that would directly affect legal rights and duties. 6i Standing has been
limited historically to "individual interests that an administrative
agency has been specially charged by statute with protecting. ' 462
Under current doctrine, this excludes diffuse interests such as those of
consumers, labor unions, environmentalists, or even customer or
supplier industries.463 Finally, most statutes relevant to industrial
policy grant wide agency discretion, so that it would be difficult for a
plaintiff to show that the agency had applied criteria not authorized
under the relevant statute, or had reached a decision inconsistent with
the terms of that statute.4M
Japan's antidumping practice to date has been marked by a
4s7 Id. at 170-71.
"s Id. at 17 1.
I d. at 173.
460 Id. at 176.
"' Id. at 171. See also, Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative
Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan,
84 COLuM. L. RaV. 923 (1984).
462 UPaHM, supra note 454, at 171-72.
I6 d. at 173.
I" ld. at 173.
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preference for informal dispositions, and thus the formal legal actions
required for justiciable challenges are rare. Even if formal legal action
were taken, a leading Japanese trade practitioner states that it is
"widely acknowledged" that a decision to impose an anti-dumping
duty would not be reviewable for two reasons.465 First, such a
decision would be implemented finally by a Cabinet order, which
under current practice arguably would not be subject to judicial
review.i Second, any potential plaintiff would lack standing, 467
which presumably means that no potential plaintiff could possess a
legal as opposed to a merely factual interest in the disposition. As
noted above, given Japan's restrictive standing doctrines one would
expect that groups representing more generalized interests, such as
consumer groups or unions, would lack standing to either challenge
antidumping duties, or to challenge rejections of antidumping
requests. What would be more difficult to justify legally would be a
refusal to recognize standing in a foreign exporter or a Japanese
importer positively affected by the imposition of antidumping duties.
This issue has not yet arisen, but as Hagiwara notes, this is a very
sensitive issue because its resolution could affect the availability of
judicial review of other administrative actions.468 In spite of its GATT
obligation to provide judicial review, one would expect the Japanese
government to be reluctant in granting rights of judicial review to
foreigners that are not available to its own citizens.
2. Judicial Review of Antidumping Decisions in South Korea
South Korea provides for judicial review of agency actions
through the Administrative Litigation Act (ALA), which is based on
465 Shintaro Hagiwara, The New Anti-dumping Code: What it Means for Japan 7
(Oct. 9-14, 1994)(Paper Presented at the International Bar Association 25th Biennial
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Japan's ACLL of 1962.69 Given the nation's short history of
democracy, it is not surprising that until recently its government has
not relied upon legal mechanisms such as judicial review to buttress
its legitimacy. 70 Now that democracy is taking root it might be hoped
that judicial review of administrative actions would become fully
available; however, this does not appear to be happening with any
great speed. 71 Given the basic similarities in the industrial policies
and the legal orders of South Korea and Japan, it should come as no
surprise if the South Korean government also resists effective judicial
review in order to preserve the flexibility and discretion of its agencies
in implementing economic and trade policies.
Turning to judicial review of antidumping decisions, South
Korea's antidumping law also provides no avenue for judicial review,
so a potential plaintiff would look to the ALA.472 Under the ALA,
justiciability requires that the challenged agency action be an
"administrative act."473 According to Supreme Court doctrine, an
administrative act must: i) constitute an exercise of public authority,
ii) cause direct legal effect to the potential plaintiff, iii) constitute the
final and conclusive stage in the administrative process, and iv) be at
the point of having immediate effect. 74 The second prong of this test
seems to incorporate standing concerns, presumably leaving an
examination of the scope of agency discretion until justiciability and
standing have been found. As in Japan, standing rules appear to deny
4 Joon-Hyung Hong, The Rule of Law and Administrative Law Reforms in Korea 59
(___) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
470 On recent progress in establishing the rule of law in South Korea, see generally,
James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence of the Vortex, 40 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIVE LAWv 73 (1992); James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987
Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial
Independence, I HARvARD HUMAN RiGHTs YEARBOOK 135 (1988).
4" Hong, supra note 469, at 59-61.
... Kim, supra note 230, at 35.
473 Id.
474 Id.
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standing to groups pursuing collective interests. 75
To date no South Korean antidumping actions have been
challenged in South Korean courts. However, existing analysis
suggests that judicial review of antidumping actions remains
problematic, in spite of South Korea's obligations under Article 13 of
the Antidumping Code.476 Injury findings by the Korean Trade
Commission (KTC) do not bind the Customs Deliberation Council
(CDC), and thus would arguably be simple inter-ministry
recommendations, not final and conclusive administrative acts
reviewable under the ALA.4 7  If the CDC accepts a KTC
recommendation, the CDC sends its recommendation to the Minister
of Finance, and as with KTC recommendations, CDC
recommendations arguably would not constitute final and conclusive
administrative acts. 4 78 Coming to the end of this progression of
informal, and thus unreviewable, recommendations, it appears that
under existing Supreme Court doctrine a final Ministry of Finance or
Presidential Decree ordering the collection of antidumping duties is
also an informal act.479 Actual collection of antidumping duties by the
local customs authority arguably would be a reviewable administrative
act, so upon exhausting administrative remedies within the Office of
Customs Administration, it might be possible for an injured party to
obtain court review of this act.480 If this is indeed the only way
antidumping rulings could be reviewed, then it would seem that
review would be limited to positive determinations, excluding negative
injury or dumping findings. In addition, the doctrine denying standing
to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate collective interests would seem to
preclude bodies such as consumer groups or unions from challenging
antidumping decisions.
47' Hong, supra note 469, at 60.
476 Kim, supra note 230, at 36-38.
171 Id. at 36.
471 Id. at 37.
411 Id. This parallels the non-appealability of Cabinet orders under Japanese doctrine.
Supra text accompanying note 466.
41 Kim, supra note 230, at 37-38.
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3. Judicial Review of Antidumping Decisions in Taiwan.
Taiwan provides for judicial review of administrative action
under the Law of Administrative Litigation Procedure (LALP) and the
Law of Organization of the Administrative Court, both of which have
roots in the administrative law reforms of Meiji Japan.48' Although
post-World War II Japan abolished its administrative court system and
granted jurisdiction over administrative suits to the ordinary courts,
Taiwan has retained the Prussian-Austrian administrative court system
originally adopted by Meiji Japan.48
A party wishing to challenge an agency action may file suit in
the Administrative Court, provided, however, that all administrative
remedies have been exhausted.4" The Administrative Court is a court
of first and last instance, and although it exists within the judicial
system under the Judicial Yuan, its decisions are not subject to review
by any other body.48 The Administrative Court has jurisdiction over
"unlawful" administrative actions, which include actions in excess of
an agency's authority, or which are abuses of agency power, but do
not include decisions which are merely "improper.""48 This distinction
between unlawful afid improper actions is central to administrative
litigation in Taiwan, and turns on a determination of whether the
disputed measure was within the discretion of the agency. The
general rule seems to be that "acts conferring benefits on individuals
or involving elements of expertise or public policy are considered
discretionary, while those restricting or invading the rights of
481 Li, supra note 34, at 84-89. The discussion that follows is not applicable to
constitutional challenges to administrative action, which are heard by a Council of
Grand Justices, under the Judicial Yuan. Lawrence Shao-Liang Liu, Judicial Review
and Emerging Consitutionalism: The Uneasy Case for the Republic of China on
Taiwan, 39 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 509,516-19 (1991).
" Li, supra note 34, at 84-86.
48 Id. at 64, 88.
' Id. at 90. An exception exists for decisions of the Administrative Court challenged
on constitutional grounds, which may be heard by the Council of Grand Justices. See
Liu, supra note 481, at 533-37.
485 Li, supra note 34, at 138.
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individuals are not."4 6 If an action is found to be within the agency's
discretion, the only dispute can be over whether the action was proper
or improper, and this will not be reviewed by the Administrative
Court.
The Administrative Court has applied this unlawful/improper
distinction quite strictly, which has resulted in numerous cases being
dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction." 7 This has been traced not only to
statutory limitations on the Court's competence, but also to a "time-
honored tradition of deference to administrative discretionary
power."48 In addition, the Administrative Court is limited to hearing
disputes arising out of "administrative dispositions," and strict
interpretation of this justiciability standard has also worked to limit
review of agency measures.4"9 General policy measures do not qualify
as administrative acts reviewable by the Court, and in the past both the
Court and various agencies have used this distinction to avoid Court
review of agency actions.4
Although no information was found concerning judicial review
of antidumping actions, there are reasons to be pessimistic about the
potential for effective judicial review. Actions taken pursuant to
Taiwan's new Foreign Trade Act are potentially subject to judicial
review, but for ordinary actions the requirement to first exhaust
administrative remedies would require appeals to the Board of Foreign
Trade, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and finally, to the Executive
Yuan, before a complaint could be brought to the Administrative
Court.49" ' In addition, as is the case in South Korean practice, it seems
quite possible that all steps in the antidumping process could be held
to be merely informal recommendations, except for the final Cabinet
action ordering the collection of antidumping duties.492 If Taiwan, like
"I Id. at 140.
48 Id. at 137-42.
411 Id. at 145.
'89 Id. at 147-48.
490 Id. at 147-54.
411 Wu, supra note 322, at 372.
411 See supra text accompanying notes 476-80.
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South Korea, finds that Cabinet actions are not subject to judicial
review, then the only remaining option would be to seek review of the
actual collection of the duties by the customs authorities.
4. Prospects for More Effective Administrative Law in Japan.
South Korea. and Taiwan.
Recent developments in administrative law in Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan may signal growing pressure on these governments
to move away from bureaucratic discretion and toward transparency
and accountability. Japan's 1993 Administrative Procedure Act, while
apparently less far-reaching than might have been hoped, at least
recognizes "administrative guidance" as a legal phenomenon.493 In
1994, Korea enacted the Basic Act on Administrative Regulation and
Administration of Civil Affairs (AARACA), which empowers a
National Grievance Council to investigate citizen complaints and
could potentially limit arbitrary agency actions and the use of
"internal" guidelines. 4 There has also been discussion of a Korean
Administrative Procedures Act and a freedom of information law,
although so far neither have been enacted. 495  Finally, Taiwan's
Council of Grand Justices has made progress in recent years in
constitutional review of legislation and administrative actions, 496
though it is not clear whether the Administrative Court has been
moving forward as quickly as the Council.
These moves toward reform have the potential to strengthen
judicial review over agency actions, including antidumping
determinations, but it remains to be seen whether they will prove to be
of practical benefit. If standing rules remain restrictive, ifjudges are
'" Lorenz Kodderitzsch, Japan's New Administrative Procedure Law: Reasons for
its Enactment and Likely Implications, 24 LAW iN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 105, 117
(1991).
... HONG, supra note 469, at 49-51.
415 Id. at 51-54, 58-59. See also, James M. West, Administrative Procedure in Korea,
AMCHAM-KoREA JouRNAL, Dec. 1992, at 9.
49 Liu, supra note 481, at 534-39.
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not willing to exercise the activism necessary to extend the jurisdiction
of their courts over agency actions, if aggressive and reasonably
priced lawyers are unavailable, or if damage awards are too limited to
make suits economically feasible, then these apparent developments
in the laws will be of little practical use.
D. Weakness of Both Protectionist and Anti-Protection Forces in
Civil Society
The key attribute of the strong state is its ability to act
autonomously from particular interest groups in society. In the area
of trade policy this seems to result in weaknesses in both protectionist
and anti-protection forces in the civil societies of Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan.
1. Weakness of Protectionist Forces.
Despite the basically protectionist orientations of the industrial
policies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the strength of these
states may make the abandonment of protection easier than for
"weaker" governments, which are potentially more penetrable by the
natural constituents of protection. Part of the strength of these states
has come at the expense of an effective voice for organized labor in
government policy, including industrial policy.497 As Goldstein and
others have pointed out, the owners of industrial corporations may be
protectionist or not, depending upon the particular circumstances, and
they cannot be counted upon to support protection if they feel it will
injure their ability to export. This is especially true of multinational
corporations, which have production facilities around the world, and
which depend heavily on the free movement of goods and capital.
The story is different for organized labor, however, which represents
4 On Japan, see VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 102, at 65-72. On South Korea, see
James M. West, South Korea's Entry into the ILO: Perspectives on Corporativist
Labor Law (1 986)(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School). On Taiwan, see
Cumings, supra note 30, at 75.
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those who feel the effects of import penetration in the form of lost
jobs and/or downward pressure on wages.
By suppressing as best they can the emergence of strong,
politically effective unions, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan may have
preserved the ability to reverse course on protectionism more easily
than might be expected, given their histories of reluctance to open
their markets. There is nothing inherently protectionist about their
industrial policies, and as we have seen, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan have been only selectively protectionist for many years. At
this stage the main visible and politically active opposition to import
liberalization appears to come from agricultural interests, who have
enjoyed disproportionate political representation in Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan. Rural populations have declined drastically in
each of these nations since their modem political systems were
established, however, and as political power shifts from rural to urban
voters, it may be that political pressure for agricultural protection will
decline. If such a shift occurs, the economic bureaucracies could find
themselves able to change quite quickly, provided that they can
overcome the "stickiness" of protectionist ideology, their past policies,
and their own bureaucratic inertia.
2. Weakness of Anti-Protection Forces.
While societal forces for protectionism may be weak, forces
that could be expected to oppose protectionist measures are also
relatively weak in these nations. Anti-protection activity can be
defined as "steps taken by individuals or groups to influence
government decisionmaking on a particular trade issue [...] when the
stated preference of the actor is to prevent or minimize new trade
restrictions." '9 Interests engaging in anti-protection activities can be
divided between: i) general interests, such as household consumers,
multinational corporations, and business coalition organizations, and
41 1I DESTLER & JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED
STATES TRADE POLITICS 23 (Institute for International Economics, Policy Analyses in
International Economics No. 21, 1987).
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ii) special anti-protection interests such as exporters, business and
industrial import users, retailers, and targeted countries' exporters and
governments.4 General anti-protection interests are those whose
members gain broadly from trade, but gain only marginally from trade
in any particular product.' Special anti-protection interests are those
who will be affected by import restrictions on specific products."' 1 At
least in the United States context, general anti-protection interests
tend to be less active than specific interests in opposing trade
restrictions on particular products,0 2 which is the type of protection
sought in antidumping actions. Although this topology was developed
for purposes of analyzing anti-protection activities in the United
States, any market economy engaged in international trade should
produce a similar array of interests.
a. Weakness of general anti-protection forces.
One general anti-protection force that is noticeably weak in
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is independent consumer groups. To
a certain extent, the corporatist natures of these societies have
resulted in the "penetration" or co-opting of independent groups that
one would expect to arise in the civil society of a capitalist democracy,
including consumer groups.0 3 This can be expected to change with
the growth of political and social pluralism in these societies, but at
present it seems unlikely that a consumer group in one of these nations
would assert itself legally or politically to oppose an antidumping or
other protectionist measure.
4" Id. at 31, 35.
0 Id. at 31.
'0o id. at 35.
'02 Id. at 30.
3 On consumer behavior in Japan, see LINCOLN, supra note 33, at 80-87; VAN
WOLFEREN, supra note 102, at 52-53. On Taiwan, see WADE, supra note 30, at 290-
92 (describing recent steps toward a more independent consumer group). On South
Korea, see AMSDEN, supra note 30, at 131 n. 12 (also expressing some optimism).
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b. Weakness of special anti-protection forces.
Special anti-protection forces are also relatively weak in these
nations, due in part, certainly, to economic structures. Particularly in
Japan and South Korea, the import trade has been dominated by
"general trading companies" (GTCs), which in Japan have been
affiliated with the zaibatsu and now the keiretsu, and in Korea are
connected with the chaebol. In the anti-protection context, the
importance of this dominance is that the economically powerful
importers, whose economic interests one would suppose would
oppose protection, are connected with industrial groups that are
subject to government trade policy controls. An importer that is part
of a large manufacturing group must be wary of opposing government
industrial policy for fear of consequences to the group's larger
interests.
Large-scale retailing interests also might be expected to
oppose import restrictions of almost any kind, but at least in South
Korea and Japan, large-scale domestic retailers also tend to be
associated with large business groups, so they may also be hesitant to
openly oppose protectionist government policies. In addition, until
quite recently foreign investors in all three nations were blocked from
establishing their own large-scale import and distribution subsidiaries,
either by restrictions on the granting of unlimited trading licenses, or
by size limits on foreign-owned retail space. This hurdle is slowly
being overcome in Japan and South Korea, but trade disputes over
legal restrictions on large-scale retailing have been serious and
protracted. This also can be expected to change with time, and to the
extent that large-scale pure foreign or domestic retailers are allowed
to grow in economic influence, one can expect them to increase their
anti-protection activities.
E. Economic and Geopolitical Constraints Potentially Influencing
A ntidumping Enforcement
In addition to the factors discussed above, which seem to be.
inherent in the capitalist economic development model, there are
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larger economic and geopolitical realities that are likely to influence
antidumping practices in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Some
factors will be common to two of these nations, if not all three, while
other concerns will primarily affect just one nation.
1. Issues Common to Japan. South Korea and Taiwan.
All three economies are moving from relatively protected to
more open economies, and although they are at different stages of this
liberalization process, the very fact of this dynamic suggests that there
will be increased pressure for antidumping relief. However, the
industrial policy bureaucracies of all three nations still engage in
targeting of strategic new industries, which in the past has included
both subsidization and protection from foreign competition. If
liberalization removes other tools for protecting targeted industries,
and if a targeted industry is faced with serious import penetration, the
pressure for the antidumping arm of the bureaucracy to assist the
strategic industry arm of the same bureaucracy will be strong. Finally,
all three nations are losing or have lost their competitiveness in labor-
intensive industries. Unless these governments provide long-term
protection for such industries, they will be forced to engage in
defensive measures to cushion the displacements caused by increased
imports. It seems inevitable that antidumping actions against labor-
intensive imports will increase as these industries in Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan continue to lose competitiveness.
2. Issues Specific to Japan.
Japan's huge trade surpluses already appear to make the
government reluctant to use antidumping measures. For Japan, to
invoke antidumping measures against manufactured goods from other
developed nations could draw additional attention to its skewed intra-
industry trade patterns, and could invite retaliation. But Japan may
also be reluctant for political reasons to use antidumping measures
against its former colonies, or against developing countries in Asia
which are growing markets for Japanese products and where Japanese
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companies have established factories.
3. Issues Specific to South Korea.
Unlike Japan and Taiwan, South Korea has never enjoyed
large trade surpluses, except for a few years in the late 1980s. South
Korea is dependent upon Japan for imports of capital goods and
components for its exports, but at the same time is attempting to
lessen this dependence by "localizing" technologies. Such concerns
are likely to lead to "Hamiltonian" or "retardation" antidumping
actions, particularly if other means for protecting "infant" industries
are limited by WTO or bilateral pressures. In addition, wages in
South Korea have risen very quickly in connection with increased
democracy, which may result in a large number of low-skill, labor
intensive industries becoming uncompetitive in a short period of time.
Although South Korea might prefer to follow Japan's highly informal,
discretionary approach, domestic pressures for protection may be too
great.
South Korea also faces interesting political issues with regard
to its relations with China and North Korea. South Korea has seen a
flood of imports from China since relations between the two were
normalized, and has taken a number of"escape clause" actions against
Chinese products. So long as China is not a member of the WTO
South Korea does not need to conform to WTO rules with regard to
Chinese products, but it does need China's cooperation in dealing with
North Korea, and it does see China as a new market for its own
exports.
4. Issues Specific to Taiwan.
Taiwan also has a large trade surplus, particularly with the
United States, though it maintains consistent trade deficits with Japan.
Taiwan is very concerned about a flood of imports from China if both
nations join the WTO, and reportedly is considering invoking the
Article XXXV exemption, which allows a country to refuse GATT
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treatment to a political adversary. s 4 Like South Korea, Taiwan is
heavily dependent upon imports of capital goods and high-technology
inputs from Japan, and will try to develop its own production to
reduce its reliance on Japan. As new Taiwanese competitors are
established, Japanese exporters can be expected to keep their prices
as competitive as possible, which is likely to lead to antidumping
complaints of the "Hamiltonian," or "retardation of industry" types.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the history of antidumping enforcement in the Bretton
Woods era, a pattern developed whereby mature industries in
developed countries would seek import relief before quasi-judicial
administrative bodies, in relatively open and adversarial proceedings.
Often the targets of these actions were newly developed export
industries in the countries of East Asia, and other parts of the
developing world. In historical terms this represents something of a
change in emphasis for antidumping enforcement, which in the
nineteenth century "Hamiltonian" view sought to protect "infant"
industries, in the original "late developers", from predatory dumping
by established and more advanced foreign competitors.
In recent years, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have enacted
and begun to apply their own antidumping legislation, in ways that
reflect their own political and economic circumstances, and perhaps
a different view of the state's role in coordinating economic activity.
In the "Hamiltonian" pattern, industries in South Korea and Taiwan
appear ready to seek protection from dumped imports during their
early development, as opposed to during their mature or declining
stages, although these "late developers" also now have mature or
declining industries needing protection in the pattern prevailing in the
West. Japan is now at such a high technological level that
"Hamiltonian" antidumping actions seem unlikely, though if Japan had
.04 Osman Tseng, Fears of Mainland Products Flooding Taiwan After Gaining
GATT Membership, BusiNEss TtAwAN, Oct. 3, 1994, at __ available in LEXIS,
Textline Library, Far East File.
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no other industrial policy tools to protect an important new industry,
an "infant" industry antidumping action would not be out of the
question. Japan's antidumping actions to date, few as they are, are
primarily standard, developed country attempts to protect labor
intensive industries facing price competition from lower cost, foreign
competitors.
Finally, the state has played a central role in the development
processes of these countries, and the antidumping laws which they
have adopted maintain a central role for economic planning
bureaucrats. When combined with the relative absence of effective
judicial review of administrative action, it appears that the adversarial,
quasi-judicial model of antidumping proceedings in the United States
will not be followed in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, though
particularly in the latter two nations, pressures for openness and
economic democracy are strong. Although WTO discipline requires
the adoption of certain formal elements mirroring those in use in the
West, the underlying reality will continue to reflect significantly
different beliefs, circumstances, and objectives.

